CURRENT DEBATES IN SOCIAL THEORY

IV SEMESTER

CORE COURSE

SOC4 C11

M.A. SOCIOLOGY

(2019 Admission onwards)

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

School of Distance Education,
Calicut University P.O.,
Malappuram - 673 635, Kerala.

190363

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
Study Material
IV Semester
Core Course (SOC4 C11)

M.A. SOCIOLOGY

CURRENT DEBATES IN SOCIAL THEORY

Prepared by:
   Biju K,
   Asst. Professor, S D E, University of Calicut.
   Jawhar C T
   Asst. Professor, S D E, University of Calicut

Scrutinized by:
   Dhanya C D,
   Guest Lecturer in Sociology
   Sree Sankaracharya University
   Kalady, Ernakulam.

Preface

From the early nineteenth century, sociology made an immense contribution to the field of social theory. The theory is perhaps one of the broadest areas of sociological inquiry and serves as a foundation or framework for more specialized study in specific substantive areas of the field. Sociologists try to examine the general nature of social reality and to analyze specific characteristics of emerging modern society.

In terms of contemporary sociological theory, it provides a better way of comprehending the social reality as an interaction between the structure and individual as both have their role in changing society. Recent decades have also witnessed an increased emphasis on the contemporary social reality by several sociologists through their theories, such as Anthony Giddens, Bourdieu, Daniel Bell, Zygmund Baumann, George Ritzer etc.

This study material introduces you to major contemporary theories within the field of sociology. It also enables the students to familiarize basic concepts and ideas in contemporary sociological theory. Therefore, this material helps the students to comprehend social reality from the perspectives of sociological theory.

MODULE I

INDIVIDUALISATION AND SOCIETY

Anthony Giddens

Life Sketch

Anthony Giddens was born in Edmonton, north London, in 1938, the son of a London transport employee. He attended a local grammar school before attending Hull University, where he specialized in sociology and psychology. He excelled in these subjects, graduating with honors in 1959. He traveled to the London School of Economics after graduation to finish his MA thesis on "Sport and Society in Contemporary England." He began teaching sociology at Leicester University in 1961. He did not teach the second-year course in classical sociological theory at Leicester.

In the 1990s, Giddens' career took an intriguing turn. He worked with a therapist for three and a half years, starting in 1989. The encounter piqued his interest in impersonal life and emotions, leading to the books Modernity and Self-identification and The Transformation of Intimacy, which explore the self, identity, love, and sexuality. He's explained how he began to make links between his circumstances and societal and cultural developments on a local and global scale, and how he came to reconsider the matter in light of the former.

In each of the three main phases of his work, British sociologist Anthony Giddens has established himself as a global theorist: first, as a major interpreter of the classical tradition and its successors; second, as the author of

structuration theory, a highly influential treatment of agency and structure in which neither is given primacy; and third, as a commentator on late modernity and its successors.

In his academic career, he went through three distinct stages. The first involved giving a theoretical and methodological understanding of sociology based on a critical reinterpretation of the classics and defining a new perspective of what sociology is. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (1971) and New Rules of Sociological Method (1976) were two of his key works at the time. Giddens established the idea of structuration in the second stage, which is an examination of agency and structure in which neither is given prominence. His publications from that period, such as Central Problems in Social Theory (1979) and The Constitution of Society (1984), earned him international recognition in the field of sociology.

The most recent stage is concerned with modernity, globalization, and politics, particularly modernity's impact on social and personal life. The Consequence of Modernity (1990), Modernity and Self-Identity (1991), The Transformation of Intimacy (1992), Beyond Left and Right (1994), and The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1995) reflect this stage, as do his critiques of postmodernity and discussions of a new "utopian-realist" third way in politics (1998). Giddens' goal is to reform social theory as well as re-examine our understanding of modernity's development and trajectory. Giddens is currently an Emeritus Professor at the London School of Economics and he is a Life Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

Structure and agency

The sociological theory revolves around the principles of structure and agency. Structures are commonly thought of as the most stable and long-lasting features of the social

environment. Structure, as defined by Durkheim and others working in a similar tradition, is a metaphor for societal features.

Durkheim's work was significantly inspired by his goal to establish a separate domain of study for sociology from biology and psychology.

The Concept of Structure, Giddens aimed to underline that social structure is always being generated via the flow of everyday social practice by using the term structuration, which he borrowed from French, to express his theory. As a result, his perspective contrasts from popular positivist and micro-sociological conceptions of structure, which see structure as either law-like regularities among social facts or stable patterns of aggregate behaviour across time.

Thus, rather than focusing on one or the other, structuration focuses on the interaction between individuals and society, as well as a process rather than static qualities or patterns.

As a result, Giddens uses an unusual definition of structure: "rules and resources arranged as features of social systems," which only exists as structural properties. These resources are classified as either allocative or authoritative, with the former referring to "transformative capacity generating command over objects, goods, or material phenomena" and the latter to "transformative capacity generating commands over persons or actors." Giddens also distinguishes between "rules of social life," which are "techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices," and "formulated rules," which are "codified interpretations of rules rather than rules as such," such as those of a game or a bureaucracy. Giddens compares the former to mathematical equations, arguing that they provide guidelines for how to proceed in a given circumstance that people can express without

understanding or observe without being able to define the underlying concept.

Individuals and groups, such as labour unions, governments, and corporations, have the potential to ''make things happen" within structural limits and opportunities. This viewpoint and Marx's dictum that people make history, but not in circumstances of their choosing, have a lot in common. The prevailing paradigm in modern sociological thought is the ''middle way" approach to structure and agency.

Now, the discussion is less about structure vs. agency and more about specific emphases and the precise manner in which these two primary parts of social life interact or combine. The amount to which social institutions limit or determine agent behaviours, as well as the extent to which agents behave independently of social structures, have been central questions in this approach.

The link between individuals and society is at the heart of structuration theory. Giddens proposes that structure and agency constitute a mutually constitutive duality, rejecting traditional dualistic theories that regard social phenomena as being determined either by objective social structures, which are features of society as a whole or by autonomous human actors. As a result, social phenomena are the result of both structure and agency. Agency is not independent of social structure, and structure is not independent of the agency. Human agents, on the other hand, draw on social structures in their acts, which also serve to generate and reproduce social structure.

Giddens proposes three structural dimensions: signification, dominance, and legitimation, perhaps mirroring his earlier theoretical concerns in Durkheim, Marx, and Weber's work. Communication, power, and sanctions are recognized as corresponding dimensions of

interaction, with the structural dimensions related through modalities of interpretative schemes, facilities, and norms, respectively.

Giddens aims to illustrate the links between the structure and the system of interaction in his stratification model of a structure. The first sort of structure is signification, which generates meaning through well-organized linguistic webs. The interaction of agents through speech "may be structured because particular interpretations of reality can be conveyed in a human language beyond the plain meaning of mere words and thoughts". In this way, Giddens broadens the actor's function to include the ability to understand and manage a structured language through interpretive meanings.

Legitimation, the second part of his stratification model, creates a moral order by allowing society norms, values, and standards to become naturalized. Individual agents exhibit consciously, subconsciously, or unconsciously meanings of their actions when they interact. Interacting in this way shapes existing social norms and is measured against the structure's moral guidelines. As a result, this component of legitimation shapes whether or not an activity is regarded as valid in the social order. Domination is an element that focuses on the generation (and exercise of) power that stems from resource control.

A typical example can be used to illustrate the concept of legalization. The effect of social structure is seen in the work clothes of the people who are reconstructed through personal adaptation through acceptable activities. For example, people who work in an office can be expected to wear more or less formal business attire, such as suits or smart casual attire.

When we meet a person in the workplace, we draw signifier structures that shape our perception of his or her

position. When we meet someone in a professional setting, we create critical frameworks that help us understand their role.

Following from the last example, clothing not only identifies a person, but also conveys important messages about the forces they possess (i.e., the structure of dominance). Police officers' uniforms can enter a crime scene or influence people's behavior, but if they are in plain clothes, they cannot. There are also legal structures that set the appropriate dress code for specific situations where violations result in consequences.

Underlying dress code restrictions are neither rigid nor changeable. The constant reconstruction of social actors supports them, but they can change. As long as employees follow the dress code, it is possible to maintain the influence of the dress code on behavior. If certain individuals or groups violate the code, different structures may develop over time. As a result, people gain the ability to change structures.

In the delicate power connection that Karl Marx is well recognized for remarking on, Giddens recognizes forces of dominance and submission. Like Marx, Giddens argues that resources are how power is exercised. Marx, on the other hand, is more concerned with the link between the 'means of production' in a capitalist society, whereas Giddens' purpose is to comprehend power relations as a sort of interaction between the actor and the structure. Resources can be employed as a kind of authority in this connection, as shown by the boss-employee relationship. The allocation of wealth or property can also be done with resources in the form of property.

Agency

The two fundamental capabilities of what Giddens refers to as the 'Agency' are basic human acts and the

activities that follow from them. Acts as a discrete progression of action and action as a continuous low of involvements by diverse and autonomous human agents are distinguished by Giddens. The individual who wishes to investigate what he or she is doing might motivate action, according to Giddens; the self-examination process is referred to as reflexive monitoring.

The three parts of the action in Gidden's approach are 'reflexive monitoring, reasoning, and motivation'. Each component has a distinct role in the entire action process.

We engage with the atmosphere created by an individual's actions, which are influenced by both unintended effects and unrecognized conditions. Unacknowledged conditions include the unconscious sources of motivation, as well as a constant stream of special agent interference in the world. The agency's ability to act, or its ability to act, is always interacting with power. According to structural theory, agency is the most important factor in bringing about any kind of change. Change can be as simple as moving through space to interact with a new environment, so changing interaction, or as complex as voting to approve legislation that will produce new laws, thereby altering society's routine. Changes in the agency and the structure that one has influence over are created by the decision to act, whether consciously or unconsciously.

Balancing Agency and Structure

Certain theoretical difficulties are unquestionably valid according to structuration theory. We must move away from the concept that action and structure are independent and unrelated mutually opposed entities, as Giddens emphasizes, and toward the awareness that they are inextricably linked in each other.

When compared to Foucault and Elias, one of the most striking features of structuration theory is its reluctance to renounce a preoccupation with the notion of human agency. In Foucault's work, a dramatic dehumanization of the subject has the effect of making social processes appear to float in space, unanchored in human activity. For an escape from subjectivism and psychological reductionism, this is just too high a price to pay. Giddens' work exposes the flaws in Foucault's dissolution and absorption of the individual into the larger social forces at work. Furthermore, Giddens' more comprehensive definition of social activities highlights Elias' lack of nuance and precision in his concept of figuration.

The focus on the individual in social analysis is the main strength of structuration theory. Other authors have overlooked fundamental issues of human agency in their desire to break free and burn bridges. The agency–structure duality animates structuration theory more than anything else.

When we talk about human agency, we're referring to people's ability to change their circumstances and respond creatively to social restrictions. We pay attention to the way the social context moulds and forms activity and behaviour by contrasting it with structure.

The concept of agency itself emphasizes that humans are not simply helpless victims of social circumstances. The interconnectedness of agencies and structures is the subject of the agency–structure dilemma. The work of Giddens reflects the belief that agency and structure are inextricably linked, and that they cannot be viewed as independent entities in any way. In this way, his work resembles that of other sociologists working in the same synthetic tradition, such as Bourdieu (1977), Bauman (1973), and even Berger and Luckmann (1967).

Giddens is a big believer in emphasizing those parts of human agency that express people's ability to change their social conditions. This ability represents the inherent powers of human beings as social agents, whether defined in the tiny sense of changing the course of a conversation in a casual meeting or in a more dramatic fashion as revolutionary action.

Giddens is cautious to imply that human agency is constantly constrained by a control dialectic. That is to say, power is always enmeshed in reciprocal social interactions, which necessitates the establishment of compromises and checks that limit one's ability to enforce one's will. This is undoubtedly structuration theory's greatest strength: its attempt to embrace the full force of human ability to make a difference in the social world while acknowledging the social context's limitations.

Structuration Theory

Structuration theory is a term coined by British sociologist Anthony Giddens to describe a separate approach to the study of social connections in a series of papers published in the 1970s and early 1980s. Giddens intended for the phrase to encompass as well as go beyond the more static concept of social ''structure." He wanted the phrase to include the practical and dynamic elements of agency as well.

As a result, structuration philosophy encompasses both structure and agency. Many observers quickly noticed a striking resemblance between Giddens' structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu's work in France. Bourdieu also desired to move beyond the reification and objectivism of theories that focused on the social milieu's pressures at the expense of individual and group action. Giddens was able to fashion a path between the deterministic tendencies of Marxism and Positivism, on the one hand, and the overly voluntaristic,

free-floating approaches of interpretive sociologies such as ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, on the other, by creating a synthesis of the best from different traditions. Working within the postwar intellectual scene in France, Bourdieu constructed a path between the highly objectivist and dehumanizing tendencies of structuralism and Marxism and the idealistic and subjectivist tendencies of existentialism, which place too much emphasis on an individual's willpower.

In the formulation of structuration theory, there are three key books. The first, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (1976), dealt with several "interpretative" schools of thought in philosophy and social theory in what Giddens regarded as an exercise in logical issue clarification that would aid in the creation of the structuration synthesis. Giddens used the same method in *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979), published three years later, but this time in connection to structuralism, post-structuralism, and functionalism. The *Constitution of Society* (1984), widely regarded as the most comprehensive presentation of structuration theory, a key statement of sociological theory, is widely regarded as the most comprehensive presentation of structuration theory. The concept of "the duality of structure" is at the heart of Giddens' synthetic reconceptualization of the structure-agency couplet.

He presents the idea that structures are both the channel and the result of social actions through this concept. They serve as the "medium" of action because they supply the foundations on which agents draw while engaging in social practices through memory. Structures are also the "result" of these acts; they are formed by social practices, whether or not the players involved in the practices intended it. These structures, in turn, serve as a conduit for the practices of the following wave of actors. This is the cycle of

structuration. This is what the term "structuration" refers to. Neither structures nor agents are given precedence; both are required.

Agents, according to Giddens' "stratification model of the agent," have motives and wants, a good deal of knowledge about their social circumstances, are competent enough to grasp their hierarchy of purposes and the trade-offs between purposes that are necessary for situated contexts and are routinely engaged in the reflexive monitoring of their actions and circumstantial factors.

Structuration theory encompasses the weight of structures within its purview, as well as the material, social, and personal legacies from the past that limit what people may achieve now. It also refers to the idea that this structural heritage creates the enabling conditions for individual or collective actors to pursue their goals. However, it goes beyond these discoveries by stressing the dynamic and repeating processes by which actors ''work on" these structures by drawing from them and then either reproducing or changing them through the act of acting. The reproduction or modifications that occur as a result of the agent's actions can be either deliberate or unintended.

The link between individuals and society is at the heart of structuration theory. Giddens proposes that structure and agency constitute a mutually constitutive duality, rejecting traditional dualistic theories that regard social phenomena as being determined either by objective social structures, which are features of society as a whole, or by autonomous human actors. As a result, social phenomena are the result of both structure and agency. Agency is not independent of social structure, and structure is not independent of agency. Human agents, on the other hand, draw on social structures in their acts, which also serve to generate and reproduce social structure.

Understanding Social Theory by Derek Layder points out some critical problems in social structure.

First, in structuration theory, agency and structure are frequently conflated in a 'biased' way. The concept that agency and structure have separate identities, according to Giddens, is the outcome of "false" dualistic thinking. In actuality, action and structure blend into one another almost imperceptibly. One of the model's apparent advantages is that it appears to establish a "balance" between agency and structure's mutual effects. Giddens' assertion that structure cannot be isolated from people's reasoning and intentions, on the other hand, demonstrates a preference for agency over structure. While he appears to suggest that structures are more in other areas, he primarily argues that structures exist only as a result of actors' reasons and intentions, as well as their application in specific instances of activity. Because of the importance, he places on motives and behaviour, structural features in his theory are typically downplayed.

Second, Giddens exaggerates the impermanence and continual process of social existence, underestimating the relative durability of structural patterns and elements. A concern with process and impermanence as a basic element of social life is a corollary of Giddens' overpowering effort to embrace agency, reasons and motivations, and people's transformative capacities.

This brings us to the third flaw in structuration theory: its incapacity to analyze the influence of various social orders. Because action and structure are mutually constitutive, it is difficult to separate them to comprehend the nature of their interaction and the role that each plays in different situations. In short, it's difficult to figure out how structural aspects might predominate in particular areas at various times, while people's creative and transformative actions might take center stage at other times and places. The

concept of action and structure-forming simultaneously limits one's ability to analyses the relative impact or influence of various social orders.

Finally, structuration theory has an absorbency and flexibility that allows it to incorporate parts that appear to be incompatible. The overarching difficulty for Giddens in this regard is to maintain the mutuality of action and structure while keeping the right to discuss them independently in a traditional sense. This is most evident in his concept of "methodological bracketing," which allows social researchers to focus on either "strategic activity" or "institutional analysis." To avoid the challenge of focusing on both at the same time, this disclaimer is included in the research implications of structuration theory.

Unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness.

Individuals in structuration theory are portrayed as active, knowledgeable, and reasoning individuals. The social system imposes constraints on the agent's actions, but they do not decide what the agent does. Giddens' "stratification model of action" sheds insight on this. The individual is considered as reflexively monitoring her or his own behaviours in this concept. The actor's self-examination of his or her activity has two directions.

The first is the explanations or justifications for an actor's particular action. An actor's attempt to construct specific narratives "in the context of the question, whether initiated by others or as components of a process that the actor examines himself" is called the rationalization of action.

The second factor to consider is the goals or objectives of the activities agent. Targeted behavior refers not only to purposeful activity; it also refers to daily activities.

At three levels of consciousness, action is reflexively monitored: unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness. Giddens finds a careful balance between the Scylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of objectivism by drawing on the Freudian triadic schema represented by the id, ego, and superego, which he replaces with the ideas of unconsciousness, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness.

Unconscious, like Freudian id, the motives for activity operate beyond the agent's self - understanding. The term "practical consciousness" refers to knowledge that a person can use but cannot express verbally. Giddens uses the concept of language usage as an example. Actors can understand and communicate through language without having to specify the rules that govern their speech. The collection of knowledge that comes from the social structure in which the actor lives is called practical knowledge.

Subsequent actions are not unconscious; rather, they reflect how the structural features of the social system are integrated into practical consciousness. The discriminating awareness of the agent can be expressed verbally by him or her. Although the actor may give accounts when expressing reasons or goals, these are not complete explanations as areas of practical knowledge may permeate the performance.

Unacceptable conditions and unintended consequences of action limit any social activity. Many activities take place without the knowledge or consent of the agent, which on the one hand is limited to an unidentified operating condition and on the other hand to an unintentional effect. Since history is not a deliberate product, it is crucial to establish the deliberate behavior of the actors within history. By connecting conscious human actions to the social system, Giddens is able to achieve historical significance through his ideas of systems and functional effects.

According to Giddens, an agent is a conscious, purposeful, and overall, rational being, the result of actions that he or she knows or believes. On the other hand, conscious actions can have unintended and unintended consequences for the agent. These unintended consequences then become unrecognizable aspects of the agent's future activities.

The concept of reflexivity suggested by Giddens can be used to describe all human behavior. He claims that modernity is the result of the intervention of various institutions; It has multiple dimensions. The four basic institutional characteristics are capitalism, industrialism, governance and military power. Each of the four institutional levels of modernity has its own causal processes and structures. However, when considered together, they form an adequate framework for appreciating some of the distinctive features of modernity.

In connection with modernity, a modern self was formed, which separates the present age. In modern society a reflexivity process exists at the institutional and individual level, and it is crucial in the creation and transformation of modern systems and forms of social organization.

'All social interactions, like any other event, take place in time and space,' says Giddens. Presence and absence are intertwined in all social interactions. 'All human relationships must be contextualized in time and space, and the perception of its form, context, and immediate effect must take into account not only the objects and people that existed at that moment, but also those who were not. According to Giddens, the 'presence' and 'absence' expressed through the duality of structure are linked to the larger attributes of social systems in the smallest aspect of everyday life, i.e. agents in structure (like laws and resources) that

recreate specific patterns or social systems spatially and temporarily.

Pierre Bourdieu

Life Sketch

Bourdieu was born in the Pyrenees Mountains in a small, rural town in 1930. His accent immediately identified him as an outsider in Parisian academic circles. But he went from poor beginnings to be at the top of his class at France's most prestigious educational institutions, eventually occupying the same chair at the Colleague France as Marcel Mauss. He emphasized the necessity of establishing sociology as a science by combining empirical research and theory throughout his career. At the same time, especially in his later years, he was politically active. He was one of France's most well-known public figures when he died, best known for his criticisms of global neoliberalism and the imposition of an "American model" that favoured taking funding away from state institutions and relying solely on the private market, whether for education, culture, pensions, or welfare support. He was so well-known that on the day of his death, France's top newspapers postponed publishing to run the story on the first page.

Pierre Bourdieu was both a leading French theorist and an empirical researcher with unusually broad interests and a distinctive style. He studied Algerian labour markets, Kabyle peasant houses and calendar symbolism, marriage patterns in his native Bearne region of France, photography as an art form and hobby, museum-goers and taste patterns, modern universities, the rise of literature as a distinct field of endeavor, and the sources of misery and poverty in modern societies. Bourdieu emphasized that theory and research are inextricably linked aspects of a single social effort and that they cannot be separated.

In 1960, he started work as an assistant to University of Paris with Professor Raymond Aron. Aron also appointed him secretary of the Center for European Sociology, a research institute he formed in 1959 with funding from the Ford Foundation and support from the rest of the postwar structures. Raymond Aron's young assistant was hired as a professor at the University of Lille, where he remained until 1964 while continuing to act in Paris through courses and seminars.

In 1962, he married Marie-Claire Brizard, with whom he had three children: Jerónimo, Emmanuel, and Lauren. In the mid-1960s, he moved with his family to Antony, a southern suburb of Paris. Bourdieu stayed as a lecturer in Algiers after his year of military service. During the Algerian War, from 1958 to 1962, Bourdieu conducted ethnographic research on the conflict through a study of the Kabyle Berbers, establishing his anthropological reputation. His first book, Sociologie de l'Algérie (1958; Algerian Sociology), was an early hit in France and was released in the United States in 1962. In his 1972 book, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, a powerful intervention into anthropological theory, he leaned heavily on this fieldwork.

With the work *Un arte medio*, from 1965, Following the publication of Essays on the Social Uses of Photography in 1965, and The Love of Art in 1966, Pierre Bourdieu conducted a series of studies on cultural practices that became an important part of his sociological work in the following decade, culminating in the publication of *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* in 1979, which is his best-known and most important work in the field.

He became the director of the Center for European Sociology in 1985, which later combined with the Center for Sociology of Education and Culture to form the Center for

Sociology of Education and Culture. Remi Lenoir, his student, was in charge of preserving the mission structure of both organizations. Pierre Bourdieu's work progressively gained acceptance in the heart of French sociology. Bourdieu was a co-founder of the Liber-Raisons d'agir publishing house, which promoted the Attac movement. In 2002, he died as a result of cancer.

CULTURAL REPRODUCTION THEORY

The theory of cultural reproduction explains how socio-economic status is passed down from generation to generation. Individuals and families, according to Bourdieu, have resources in the form of economic, social, and cultural capital, which can be spent to generate new resources or converted from one type of capital to another.

Cultural capital, like economic and social capital, is a resource that may be invested to advance one's relative position within a social hierarchy populated by people with various capital compositions and amounts. Cultural capital exists in three states: embodied capital; objectified capital, and institutionalized capital. It can contribute to social reproduction in all three states.

Cultural reproduction, according to Bourdieu, is an important method through which social reproduction occurs. Different fields, or subsystems, make up society, in which varied types of capital have different weights. Education is a significant sector in which cultural capital is especially essential. Bourdieu claims that the educational system is skewed toward valuing cultural capital and ascribing favourable characteristics to those who have it. This bias derives from the association of cultural capital with high culture and social standing, and it means that the embodied cultural capital that children demonstrate in school creates an appearance of academic brilliance, which leads to positive teacher treatment and educational achievement. As a result,

cultural capital generates a misleading sense of academic genius that pays off in the form of scholastic success.

Cultural capital contributes to social reproduction by increasing the likelihood of educational success. Institutionalized cultural capital and subsequent socioeconomic success because families in advantaged socio-economic positions tend to have more cultural capital than those in less advantaged positions, and children tend to inherit capital from their parents.

Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Capital

According to cultural reproduction theory, parents have a store of cultural capital, which they pass on to their children in part. Cultural capital is transmitted through two channels: parents actively investing in transmitting their cultural capital to their children, for example, by taking them to the theatre and reading to them, and children passively acquiring cultural capital through exposure to objectified cultural capital in the home, for example, works of art. Other family resources, such as parents' financial resources and the child's academic abilities, play a role in the child's acquisition of cultural capital.

According to this theory, a kid's cultural capital is determined by the parents' active investments in passing their cultural capital to the child, as well as the child's passive exposure to cultural capital at home. The "passive" rate of cultural capital transmission from parents to children is the return in terms of the child's cultural capital on parental investments in the child's cultural capital. The economical resources of the parents, as well as the child's academic abilities, influence the child's cultural capital.

Cultural Capital, Educational Success, and Social Reproduction

Cultural reproduction theory contends that children convert their embodied cultural capital into educational success institutionalized cultural capital, which in turn promotes socio-economic success, in addition to accounting for parental transfer of cultural capital to children. As a result, cultural capital serves as a means to an end. Cultural capital, according to Bourdieu, is "a symbolically and materially active, effective capital insofar as it is seized and applied by agents." He points out "Academic achievement is strongly dependent on cultural capital and the inclination to invest in the academic market".

Bourdieu does not explain how children translate their embodied cultural capital into academic success. He claims that the educational system is predisposed to misinterpreting cultural capital as an academic genius and that as a result, students with cultural capital exploit it to project a sense of brilliance that teachers reward.

Cultural capital is misunderstood by instructors as academic brilliance because it indicates an acquaintance with high culture and social standing, and as a result, teachers implicitly equate cultural capital with other desirable attributes. Bourdieu employs the idea of the habitus to describe how children's cultural capital, which is inherited from their parents and exhibited in values, tastes, and behaviours, contributes to the formation of such an impression. And, while the perception of academic genius associated with cultural capital is deceptive in the sense that, unlike economic capital, it has no fundamental value other than that which is given to it, the repercussions are genuine.

Culturally gifted students are viewed as more academically gifted than those who do not, resulting in superior subjective teacher assessments and grades.

Furthermore, teachers regard them more favourably, which may result in a better learning environment and, as a result, improved educational success. As a result, educational success is the primary mechanism via which embodied cultural capital is translated into institutionalized cultural capital educational credentials. This concept has now been incorporated into our model.

The relationship between educational attainments, institutionalized cultural capital, and socio-economic success is the ultimate stage in cultural reproduction theory. Cultural capital has no direct impact on socio-economic success in this paradigm, but it does contribute to it through boosting educational performance, which in turn facilitates educational achievement, which has a direct impact on socio-economic position.

The Theory of Symbolic Violence

Bourdieu's work on education and the academic system is part of a larger conversation about the state and its role in instilling the thought categories that underpin social order. Between 1989 and 1991, his Collège de France courses focused on this topic. Bourdieu completes Max Weber's definition of the State by defining it not only in terms of the monopoly of legitimate violence but also in terms of the monopoly of valid symbolic violence- the latter of which suffices because it legitimizes physical violence.

Unlike the Marxist paradigm, which reduced the state to a superstructure, Bourdieu sees the state as a place where "legitimate identities" are created and methods of inclusion and exclusion are justified. While the monopolization of symbolic violence must be studied from the perspective of historical sociology, with a focus on the role of certain social groups such as jurists, as the ethnological approach demonstrates, this violence can also be observed daily in ordinary acts such as buying a house. The State is also

defined by its monopoly on the universal as a place where the 'public' and the 'official' are created.

It has the power to universalize certain practices or characteristics at the expense of others, which are referred to as particularisms, such as provincial accents versus Parisian elite accents, popular culture versus legitimate culture sanctioned by the educational system, or feminine versus masculine qualities. The State creates taxonomies and hierarchies that are absorbed by those it regulates, including those who struggle against it, in this fashion. The State, on the other hand, is not an abstraction for Bourdieu: he advocates for sociology of institutions and individuals that make up the State's meta-field.

To comprehend the dynamics of dominance, the concept of symbolic violence seeks to transcend the choice between force and consent. Symbolic violence works by combining three factors: ignorance of domination's arbitrariness; perception of domination as lawful; and internalization of domination by the dominated. This function is at work in masculine dominance, a topic Bourdieu wrote a book about.

Bourdieu demonstrates that the masculine/feminine opposition is one of the fundamental principles of world division, organizing the mythical cosmological categories of perception of space and time: high/low, above/below, right/left, outside/inside, discontinuous/continuous, extraordinary/ordinary, event/duration, based on his fieldwork in Kabyle. The basic oppositions that organise social existence lie beneath these: culture/nature, public/private, active/passive. Masculine and feminine identities are socially constructed identities (gender) implanted in individuals through bodily training, rather than biological differences. Expressions of virility, dignity, and dominance are taught to boys; expressions of femininity,

effacement, and submission are taught to girls, as well as discretion, restraint, lowered eyes, and making oneself tiny.

The sexual division of labour that comes from these gendered identities is justified by biological distinctions. As a result, socially manufactured identities become naturalized, and cultural arbitrariness appears natural. These identities are perpetuated in contemporary cultures not just by familial education, but also by institutions, the first of which are the Church, the State, and the School. Lévi-Strauss hide the political character of this foundational act of social existence, in which aggression toward women, turned into objects, is institutionalized, by framing the trade of women as the ground for dialogue between men. This method allows us to go past the binary choice between compulsion and permission that frequently underpins disputes about masculine dominance.

Symbolic violence entails complicit acquiescence on the part of the dominated, which is the outcome of the internalization of an androcentric worldview rather than a free, consensual act. The logic of women's self-exclusion from the public realm displays these mechanisms more than anything else. Women may have gained independence through access to education and birth control, but their presence in the workforce has not been enough to eliminate inequity between men and women, which is mostly due to gendered portrayals. Women are frequently paid less than males in comparable occupations. Similarly, while technological advancement has freed women from some household responsibilities, the rise of working women has not been enough to alter the gender divide in domestic tasks. Bourdieu wrote a piece in support of the homosexual and lesbian movement as an appendix to his book on masculine domination, as part of his participation as a "public intellectual".

Symbolic violence is a form of non-physical violence that takes the form of an imbalance of power between social groups. This is often unknowingly agreed upon by both parties and imposes the norms of the dominant group of the lower group. Symbolic violence can manifest itself in a variety of social contexts. It affects economic, social, political and religious life and human behavior in general.

According to the Bourdieu and Parson, the education system is considered to be a critical platform for enabling symbolic violence. School communicates current cultural values; from the language spoken in the classroom to the subjects taught in the architectural design of the buildings, the structure of the school is suited to the dominant social group.

The school is the institution most responsive to Bourdieu's thesis, meaning that it meets a unilateral cultural norm structured and structured by the academic community with minimal input from students. As a result, the academic community recognizes the dictatorship of the school routine and the education system in general, making it an ideal place to acquire knowledge and to be part of a community governed by cultural norms. . In this regard, the reality of the classroom as a platform for teachers to express their strengths cannot be ignored.

The school is a place where one can justify one's own authority arising from the teacher-student relationship. In the classroom, the teacher has statutory authority. In fact, teaching training empowers an authoritative person to be a socially recognized person who evaluates and punishes learning and student behavior to make them better than others. Clearly, everything is done within the limits of the law. The legal activity of students is slavery. They are expected to lead without question even in learning, language, behavior, and aesthetics. They are praised positively or

negatively, and they should accept these assessments freely. The student's job is to submit to the authority of authority by assuming a low hierarchical position in power relations in the classroom.

Inside the educational institution, students and teachers have a daily conservation. Teachers must fight to keep kids' attention. The teacher generally imposes various conditions and restrictions in the classroom in order to keep the pupils in the classroom and develop the topic.

Since the teacher is responsible for leading the class, the class must have the authority to make progress in all areas, and the teacher must be extremely skilled to maintain that power and influence student behavior. This is nothing more or less than the right to adhere to appropriate behavioral standards for students and to allow them to lead academically and throughout the course in each class. As a result, the influence of the teacher in the classroom is crucial, and if it is lost or absent, the teacher's chances of success are very limited.

The Bourdieu was able to examine cultural transmission as a family-based intergenerational reproduction strategy. The author emphasizes that the education system, especially the classroom, ideas, and behaviors have become the most essential medium for even becoming a citizen in today's society. This understanding allowed Bordeaux to question the school's hopeful liberal outlook as a tool for social transformation and equality, leading to more complex analyzes of the construction and recreation of difference.

Every institutionalized educational system owes the specific characteristics of its structure and functioning to the fact that it must produce and reproduce institutional conditions whose existence and persistence (self-reproduction of the system) are required both for the exercise

of its essential function of inculcation and for the fulfilment of its function of reproducing a cultural arbitrary that it does not produce.

According to Bourdieu, symbolic systems based on cultural norms simultaneously perform three interrelated but distinct functions: cognition, communication, and social diversity. Symbolic systems serve as tools of communication and domination, allowing for rational and moral consensus as well as maintaining social order.

Every power that strives to impose its ideals and connotations is valid, and any symbolic violence or influence succeeds in imposing particular connotations as legitimate connotations. Students with similar or complementary cultural capital will flourish in the educational system as a result of symbolic violence, as the school reinforces their cultural norms and dispositions created/influenced by the habitus. Symbolic violence is perpetuated not just by educational institutions, but also by respectable institutions like television, movies, and newspapers. The dominant provide their tacit agreement to symbolic violence by accepting the established categories of thought.

Agents of social domination as a result of their position and their social status in a particular area. Although violence is unconscious, it is based on systemic domination. This is the activity of the agent-owned capital. It is classified as "violent" because agents do not recognize what it is. This cultural capital nurtures feelings of insignificance and inferiority that are not objectively experienced. The legitimacy of grading patterns seen in the hierarchy of social groupings is based on symbolic violence.

There is also symbolic violence in consumer culture. Consumer culture is a type of material culture that is made possible by the marketplace, which results in a unique interaction between the consumer and the goods and services

he or she uses or consumes. Consumer culture is one of the most important areas of social change in everyday life.

Consumer culture differs from consuming in that it focuses on the interaction between the material and the cultural rather than the prestige and inequalities that come with owning consumer goods. In this sense, consumer culture is more than just a way for people to "use up" commercial things. People's interactions with consumer culture are significant because they reflect and potentially repeat particular beliefs and social position. In this sense, consumer culture is perhaps at the heart of the contemporary society's connection between structure and agency. It exemplifies capitalism's ability to perpetuate the parameters by which citizens of a consumer society go about their daily lives.

We can use as an example the connection between symbolic violence and consumer culture. J. Rius-Ulldemolins points out that different transformations have taken place in modern societies by changing the relationship between culture and consumption. As a result, the symbolic elements involved in consumption have changed significantly. Some products may be promoted and used as symbols of a particular national identity. Some marketing or political initiatives have prompted people to buy national products based on racial or national superiority.

Humor, nostalgia, and cultural memory may be used to reinforce national stereotypes that make symbolic domination less pronounced and thus more successful. It is used to enhance the emotional appeal of a product. Corporations can use this to denounce and reject symbolic domination in this context, while attempting to symbolically redefine the identity of national-linked branding.

Accepting or rejecting the superiority of another country's goods is based not only on the technical merits, but

also on the image of the nations and the recognition or rejection of the superiority of another's goods. Phenomena can be described as symbolic domination, and the accumulation of cultural capital plays a crucial role. This concept applies not only to individuals, but also to corporations and governments, as well as to increasing competition between nation-states and the use of their own culture to legalize 'national' goods in a globalized world.

Habitus and fields

Habitus

According to Bourdieu, people unconsciously accept the social patterns and norms that surround them as a result of their everyday experiences. Ideas about what is "proper" and "acceptable" become ingrained, instinctual thought and behaviour habits. Habitus is a term used by Bourdieu to describe these inherent tendencies toward specific behaviours. Habitus is defined as "the attitudes and dispositions acquired via our cultural heritage that generally persist across contexts."

Participating in social games is more than a conscious decision. It's something we do before we think about it. In certain senses, we are constantly already connected. We are groomed for adult roles from a young age. We are asked what we want to be when we grow up and are taught that having a job is important. We're taught to sit up straight and talk only when we're spoken to. We witness our parents' devotion to religion, money, or celebrity, depending on their circumstances. We acquire a distinctive technique of creating new acts, of improvising the moves of the game of our life, based on what gets acceptance or doesn't get permission, what works or doesn't work. Confidence or shyness is what we learn. But, in either scenario, much of the socialization process's power is felt physically, as part of who we are and how we live in the world. This is the habitus

sense. The term "habitus" is notoriously difficult to define, but it mainly refers to the embodied sensibility that allows for structured improvisation.

Because they have evolved physically embodied capacities to hear and respond correctly to what is being generated by others, and to create themselves in ways that others can hear sensibly and to which others can respond, jazz musicians can play together without consciously following rules. In Bourdieu's metaphor, efficient gameplay necessitates not only rule knowledge but also a practical sensibility for the game.

This is a challenge to structuralism's static cognitivism, but it's also a challenge to existentialist understandings of subjectivity. By posting a "kind of unprecedented encounter between the self and the world," Sartre produced his renowned explanation of the existential predicament. However, this misrepresents how true social life works since it ignores the habitus long-term tendencies. In other words, before anyone becomes a subject, they are already instilled with institutional knowledge, including recognition and misrecognition.

In one sense, the habitus appears to be each individual's unique set of action inclinations. There is a social process of matching such dispositions to positions in the social order. The habitus, however, is more than that. It's where institutions and bodies come together. That is, it is the fundamental method in which each person as a biological being interacts with the socio-cultural order in order for the different games of life to continue to have meaning and to be performed.

Bourdieu underlined that habitus is a collective achievement rather than an individual capability. It's the consequence of a widespread 'collective inculcation effort.' Individuals become who they are and social institutions exist

only on the strength of this inculcation of orientations to action, appraisal, and understanding, which is why strategies can operate without individuals being consciously strategic. The most profound social changes must manifest themselves not only informal institutions but also in habitual action orientations. Bourdieu aimed to break down the divide between culture, social organization and embodied individual being that exists in most sociology today.

Habitus refers to the long-term set of dispositions that we as social actors carry around in our heads as a result of our social experience in various backgrounds and circumstances (class, language, ethnicity, gender, and so on). Our experience in specific social situations and circumstances predisposes us to approach the world with the knowledge and interpersonal resources we've gained there. As a result, habitus is a cognitive and motivational process that takes into account a person's social surroundings and serves as a conduit or channel for knowledge and resources to be passed to the behaviours that they inform. As a result, the mutual impacts of objective context and current activity conditions are transferred back and forth through the habitus. While a person's habit determines the broad bounds of their activity, they must also be seen as creative beings. People must 'improvise' on background resources in specific settings to deal with the unpredictable scenarios that are a part of everyday life.

Field

The term field (or cultural field) is used by Bourdieu to characterize structured, social environments that contain norms and practices that promote specific ways of being and thinking. In an article titled "Champ intellectual et project créateur," Bourdieu first used the term of the field to analyses a disagreement between two French scholars, Roland Barthes and Raymond Picard. Despite their differences,

Bourdieu claimed that both academics were pursuing the same academic goal: such conflicts were the material of scholarly practice, and both researchers were equally invested in the inherent value of controversy and debate. Education, culture, television, literature, science, housing, bureaucracy, and the restructured social sites of globalized de-industrialization became increasingly important aspects of Bourdieu's work, and much of his later writing was concerned with these specific fields.

Individuals and institutions build and sustain networks of relationships in each field, which have their logic, traditions of required behaviour, and reasoning. The habitus evolves inside various cultural domains as a result of what is considered reasonable, suitable, and important within that sector.

The word "field" conjures up an image of a meadow in English. It's probably early summer, and the meadow is a riot of wildflowers and grasses, encircled by a dense forest. This type of field is referred to as le pré in French. However, Bourdieu did not write about the lovely and benign les prés, but rather about le champ, a term that may be used to denote a piece of land, a battleground, or a field of knowledge, among other things. The field on which a football game is played (le terrain in French); the field in science fiction (as in "Activate the force-field Spock"); or even a field of forces in physics are all analogues for Bourdieu's le champ. While Bourdieu's definition of le champ, or field, incorporates components of all three analogies, it does not equate to any of them.

A football field is a fenced-in area where a game takes place. Players have predetermined positions to play the game- the football field is visualized as a square with internal divisions and an external boundary, with the predetermined positions marked in predetermined locations. As they begin

to play the game, rookie players must acquire specific regulations as well as basic skills. The field position determines what players may do and where they can travel during the game. The field's actual physical condition has an impact on what players can do and consequently how the game is played. It's not that far-fetched to imagine a social field that doubles as a football field.

Bourdieu did talk about social existence as if it were a game. He commonly referred to it as a football game, possibly because he was familiar with the sport.

The social field, like a football pitch, does not exist in isolation. Bourdieu coined the term "social field" to describe a method of studying human behaviour. That is, the concept of the social field has insufficient explanatory "take" on its own. Rather than becoming mired down in pointless disputes about the primacy of social institutions or human agency, Bourdieu advocated for a technique that brought together an interconnected and co-constructed triad – field, capital, and habitus – with none of them being main, dominating, or causal.

According to Bourdieu, the game that takes place in social spaces or fields is competitive, with diverse social agents employing a variety of methods to retain or strengthen their position. The buildup of capitals is at risk in the field: capitals are both a process inside and an outcome of a field. Economic (money and assets); cultural (e.g. forms of knowledge; taste, aesthetic, and cultural preferences; language, narrative, and voice); social (e.g. affiliations and networks; family, religious, and cultural heritage); and symbolic (things that stand for all of the other forms of capital and can be "exchanged" in other fields, e.g. credentials).

Fields will differ in terms of how much autonomy they gain from the entire social field. A high level of specificity

characterizes an autonomous field: it has its history; a specific configuration of agents operates inside it and competes for a separate stake; it has its habitus and defends a distinct set of beliefs. Such an autonomous sphere is highly differentiated and defined by sharp boundaries beyond which it loses its ability to influence practice.

Academia, according to Bourdieu, is such a field that is immersed in and reflects social relations. The field, for Bourdieu, refers to the various areas of social places in which capital is deployed or the habitus acts: "the habitus' embodied potentialities are only ever fulfilled in the context of a specific field."

Forms of capital

Capital is accumulated labour that allows agents or groups of agents to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour when appropriated on a private, i.e. exclusive, basis.

Capital, which takes time to accumulate in its objectified or embodied forms and contains a tendency to persist in its being as a potential capacity to produce profits and reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things such that everything is not equally possible or impossible. And, at any given time, the structure of the distribution of different types and subtypes of capital represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints enshrined in the very reality of that world that govern its long-term functioning, determining the chances of success for practices.

Capital can take three basic forms, depending on the field in which it operates and the cost of the more or less expensive changes that are required for its efficacy in the field in question: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and maybe

institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible into economic capital under certain conditions and may be institutionalised in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, which is made up of social obligations and is convertible into economic capital under certain conditions and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications.

Cultural capital

Cultural capital can take three forms: in the embodied state, in the form of long-lasting mental and physical dispositions; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods such as pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, and so on, which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematic, and so on.

The embodied state

The fact that cultural capital is fundamentally tied to the body and assumes embodiment explains the majority of its features. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, that is, in the form of culture, cultivation, and building, necessitates a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, insofar as it entails a labor of inculcation and assimilation, costs time, time that must be invested personally by the investor.

Unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility, this embodied capital, external riches changed into an inherent part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transferred instantly by gift or bequest, purchase, or exchange. As a result, the use or exploitation of cultural capital poses unique challenges for those with economic or political capital, whether they are private patrons or, on the other hand, entrepreneurs employing culturally competent executives.

The objectified state

Cultural capital has many features in its objectified condition that are only defined in connection to cultural capital in its embodied form. In its materiality, cultural capital objectified intangible items and media, such as books, paintings, monuments, instruments, and so on, is transmissible. A collection of paintings, for example, can be passed down in addition to financial capital. But what is transmissible is legal ownership, not what is required for specific appropriation, such as possession of the means or "consuming" a painting or operating a machine, which, as embodied capital, are subject to the same principles of transmission.

Materially, which requires economic capital, and symbolically, which requires cultural capital, cultural commodities can be seized. As a result, the owner of the means of production must find a way to appropriate either the embodied capital or the services of the capital holders. He only needs economic capital to own the machines; he also needs access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or through a proxy, to appropriate and use them for their intended purpose. This is, without a doubt, the source of cadres' uncertain status.

The institutionalized state

The objectification of cultural capital in the form of academic credentials is one means of neutralizing some of the qualities that it acquires from the fact that it is embodied and so has the same biological restrictions as to its bearer. This objectification distinguishes between the autodidact's capital, which can be called into question at any time, and the courtier's cultural capital, which can only yield ill-defined profits of fluctuating value in the market of high-societyexchanges, and the cultural capital academically

sanctioned by legally guaranteed qualifications, formally independent of the market of high-society exchanges.

Social alchemy creates a form of cultural capital with relative autonomy vis-à-vis its bearer and even vis-à-vis the cultural capital he effectively possesses at a given point in time with the academic qualification, a certificate of cultural competence that confers on its holder a conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value concerning culture.

In the absence of any planned inculcation, and hence rather subconsciously, cultural capital can be accumulated to varying degrees depending on the period, society, and social status. It is always marked by its early conditions of acquisition, which contribute to determining its particular worth through the more or less evident signs they leave (such as the pronunciations characteristic of a class or location). It cannot be gathered beyond an individual agent's appropriating capacities; it deteriorates and dies with the bearer.

It defies the old, deep-rooted distinction made by Greek jurists between inherited properties and acquired properties, i.e., those which an individual adds to his heritage because it is thus linked in numerous ways to the person in his biological singularity and is subject to a hereditary transmission that is always heavily disguised, if not invisible. As a result, it can combine the prestige of inherited property with the advantages of acquisition. Because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more masked than those of economic capital, symbolic capital is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, that is, to be unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence, as authority exerting a (mis)recognition effect, such as in the matrimonial market and all markets where economic capital is not fully recognized.

Social capital

Social capital is the sum of actual or potential resources linked to the possession of a long-term network of more or less institutionalised mutual acquaintance and recognition—or, in other words, membership in a Group— that provides each of its members with the backing of collectively owned capital, a "credential" that entitles them to credit, in a variety of forms. These ties may only exist in a practical sense, in the form of material and/or symbolic exchanges that aid in their maintenance. They can also be socially instituted and guaranteed through the use of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe, or the name of a school, a party, etc.) and a series of instituting acts aimed at simultaneously forming and informing those who are subjected to them; in this case, they are more or less enacted and thus sustained and reinforced in exchanges.

They are partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in physical (geographical) space, or even in economic and social space because they are founded on indissolubly material and symbolic exchanges, the establishment and maintenance of which necessitate acknowledgment of proximity.

The magnitude of the network of connections a given agent may effectively mobilize, as well as the volume of capital (economic, cultural, or symbolic), possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected, determine the volume of social capital possessed by that agent. This means that, while social capital is relatively irreducible to economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even the entire set of agents with whom he is connected, it is never completely independent of it because the exchanges instituting mutual acknowledgment presuppose the reacknowledgement of a minimum of objective homogeneity, and because it has a multiplier effect.

The network of relationships is the result of individual or collective investment strategies aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, i.e., transforming contingent relationships like those of neighborhood, workplace, or kinship into relationships that are both necessary and elective. This is accomplished through the alchemy of consecration, the symbolic constitution produced by social institutions such as a relative—brother, sister, cousin, etc.— or as a knight, an heir, an elder, etc.—and endlessly reproduced in and through the exchange that it encourages and that presupposes and produces mutual knowledge and recognition.

Exchange re-produces the group by transforming the goods exchanged into indications of recognition and, as a result, through mutual recognition and the acknowledgment of group membership that it entails. Likewise, it reaffirms the group's limitations, i.e., the boundaries beyond which the constitutive exchange-trade, commensality, or marriage cannot occur. Because the definition of the criteria of admission is at stake in each new entry, each member of the group is thus established as a custodian of the group's bounds: he can modify the group by modifying the limits of permissible exchange through some form of misalliance. In most communities, it is natural that the planning and conclusion of weddings should be the responsibility of the entire society, rather than the agents immediately involved. The admission of new members into a family, clan, or club puts the group's entire definition, i.e., its rules, boundaries, and identity, on the line, vulnerable to reinterpretation, change, and adulteration.

When families lose the monopoly of establishing exchanges that can lead to lasting relationships, whether socially sanctioned like marriage or not, as in modern

societies, they can continue to control these exchanges while remaining within the logic of laissez-faire, through all the institutions that are designed to favor legitimate exchanges and exclude illegitimate ones by producing a legal system.

It brings together, seemingly by chance, persons who are as homogeneous as possible in all relevant dimensions in terms of the group's existence and persistence. The replication of social capital necessitates a never-ending sociability effort, a never-ending set of encounters in which recognition is constantly maintained and renewed.

Economic Capital

Many types of capital can be obtained from economic capital, but only at the expense of a more or less significant transformation effort, which is required to develop the type of power that is successful in the field at hand. For example, some goods and services can be obtained immediately, without secondary costs, thanks to economic capital; others can only be obtained through a social capital of relationships (or social obligations) that cannot act instantly, at the appropriate time, unless they have been established and maintained for a long time, as if for their own sake, and thus outside their period of use i.e., at the cost of a long-term investment in sociability, because time lag is one of the causes in the transformation of a pure and simple debt into the acknowledgment of nonspecific obligation known as gratitude.

Conclusion

Bourdieu's theory is made up of a collection of interconnected concepts that can only be comprehended in context. The objectivist or inquiry moment, in which we set out to characterize the external social structures, the objective, the socially made thing, is the starting point of social analysis. The subjectivist, or investigation of internal,

subjective social systems, will be the second stage of the analysis. His work is organized around many guiding notions, including habitus as a basis of agent activity, fields as places of social rivalry, and symbolic violence as a basic method for imposing dominance relations.

Zygmund Bauman

Life Sketch

Zygmund Bauman was a Polish-born sociologist who was one of Europe's most influential intellectuals, known for works that examine broad changes like contemporary society and their effects on communities and individuals. He was born November 19, 1925, in Pozna, Poland, and died January 9, 2017, in Leeds, England. He concentrated on how social changes have impacted the poor and dispossessed.

After Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Bauman and his family fled to the Soviet Union, where he served in a Polish army unit under Soviet leadership throughout World War II. He was also a member of a Stalinist organization aimed to put down communist resistance. After the war, Bauman returned to Poland, where he studied sociology and philosophy at the University of Warsaw in the 1950s, eventually becoming a professor of sociology. An anti-Semitic campaign prompted him to leave his work and home, and he relocated to Israel, briefly teaching in Tel Aviv and Haifa until accepting a position at the University of Leeds in 1971, from which he retired in 1990.

Modernity and the Holocaust (1989), in which he argued that modern industrial and bureaucratic paradigms made the Holocaust imaginable and possible to carry out, and Liquid Modernity(2000), in which he looked at the effects of consumption-based economies, the disappearance of social institutions, and the rise of globalization. His other notable publications included *Culture as Praxis* (1973),

Modernity and Ambivalence (1991), *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (1997), *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (1998), *The Individualized Society* (2001), *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts* (2003), and *Strangers at Our Door* (2016).

Liquid Modernity

The notion of liquidity was further explored in Bauman's subsequent publications, which were devoted to various facets of modernity: Liquid Love, Liquid Life, Liquid Fear, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty, and Liquid Evil are all books about the fragility of human bonds. He has recently written about the democratic crises, the struggle against terrorism, and the migratory problem. Professor Bauman died on January 9th, 2017.

In his book Liquid Modernity, Bauman defines postmodernity as "current modernity divided into two parts: early modernity and late modernity." Perhaps the most noteworthy anomaly in this era is the role of time and place, which had been inseparable but neutral in pre-modernity. The initial period of modernity was designed to dominate space by elevating the contribution of time. To put it another way, time was regarded as the most significant or primary tool of power and thus domination. Time was in charge of organizing and directing modern space, as well as regulating human life within it.

So, in the early stages of modernity, it was important to emphasize the chronological dimensions of progress. Somehow, velocity was regarded as the sole means of advancement, to achieve a clear edge over materialism. Dominance was maintained by taming space, which included sharing products and sending military, as well as confining factory workers through various rules. In Bauman's view, the ecosystem of modernity is comprised of attention to time

management, material management, and workforce management.

Bauman's liquid modernity is a word that can overcome the concept of postmodernism because it focuses on the contemporary world: the reality in which life prioritizes the transient over the permanent, the immediate over the long term, and prioritizes utility over all other values. As a result, it's critical to grasp the concept of fluidity, which Bauman weaves his most recent philosophical and sociological reflections around, in advance and thoroughly.

Modernity and postmodernity, which become liquid modernity as it pertains to contemporary reality, have unique features of solidity and liquidity. It is an existence in which need gives way to want, which befuddles men in the incessant changes and transformations that impact their lives, turning identification from a fact to a task: each of us runs into self-building, which substitutes the project itself.

Indeed, because the concepts of identity, individual, and uniqueness have lost their value in our modern age, the connection between the person and society is changing. The world requires of each individual a constant and increasingly contentious search for identification, as well as the tracking of standardized. Being an individual in a liquid society entails not only being a good consumer but also being a competitive commodity on the global market. Such a situation necessitates not just the purchase of "fashion products," but also the purchase of a "fashionable body" that aids in the complete transition from self-manipulation of our physicality to the direct and autonomous choice of the body we desire for our children.

According to Bauman's futuristic perspective, "being fit for the global" would not be pleased for long with plastic

surgery and remodeling based on topoi that are constantly generated by global market regulations.

Having is attained through consumerism, which includes incorporation and possession. Consumption is a type of possession that is possibly the most significant in today's wealthy industrial culture. Consumption has contradictory characteristics: it soothes anxiety because what one has cannot be taken back, but it also requires consumers to consume more frequently, as prior consumption quickly loses its gratifying distinctiveness.

And this vicious spiral, which runs between possession and consumption, is the most visible effect of what Bauman calls liquid modernity, which, unlike postmodernism, has a continuous relationship with the modernization process, which has its origins in modern times - but it prolongs and intensifies until it reaches the liquidity of our time, which is characterized by rampant consumerism. And one of the defining characteristics of our time is the convergence of identity and consumption, because contemporary society treats its citizens first as consumers, and only secondarily, and in part, as creators.

Furthermore, additional statistics reveal that in times of severe economic crises, such as the one we are currently experiencing economic issues due to Covid, primary consumption, or fundamental necessities, is set aside to acquire high technology products, apparel, and cosmetics. These products aim to modernize the body following the minimum standards required to be "in," i.e., to achieve a social status that does not differentiate, but rather encompasses all those who appear to be able to modernize themselves, regardless of social productive capacity or the role that anyone can play.

Consumption today appears to be a homogenizing activity, according to Bauman, and it is a way of determining

how individual a person may be in a liquid society. Bauman bases his ideas about the individual and society on this concept, which he divides into two categories. The first is expressed in the notion that in the liquid world, the conquest of identity is inextricably linked to conformity to the rules of a consumer society governed by global market policies: being persons is the same as being customers. The second line, on the other hand, takes that idea a step further by incorporating the individual into the products.

The latest adjustments and revolutionary modifications that are classed as postmodernism, according to Bauman, belong to the second phase of modernity. This change is intended to increase the velocity of the present phase to preserve time and gain control over space. The natural speed of the second phase, on the other hand, is not considered sufficient. This is why the postmodern era is adamant about developing instruments that are innovative in terms of saving time through increased extreme velocity.

That is why electronic trains, jet flights, fast and automobiles are emblems of power; to conclude, power in the postmodern era is instantaneous. The infiltration of power into materialistic aspects of life has resulted in an ephemeral power station. Every day productions save time and space in comparison to previous ones. There are two irrefutable parts of postmodern logic toward life: there is an enslaved life under the rule of technology and consumerism, and there is an enslaved life under the rule of technology and consumerism. They are the most energizing necessities in an appealing society to stay tuned to not miss out on the most recent changes.

Individuals become lonely monads, constantly seeking new forms of socialization that, rather than offering safety and welfare, widen the divide between man and himself and man and others. It's a social system that, despite having

increasingly innovative ways to connect and interact with one's peers, causes discomfort and loneliness.

The contribution of the internet to the new model of sociability based on individualism is the most important function it plays in the structuring of social ties. People are being grouped into social networks that interact via computer. Thus, rather than the internet creating a model of networked individualism, the internet's development must provide adequate material backing for individualism's proliferation on the web as the main type of online socializing.

Consumption serves as a stand-in for social gathering, but it replaces a sense of belonging with a desire to be included. This method unavoidably excludes people who do not have the necessary resources to engage in this activity, which is fundamentally solitary. In addition to these consumer-oriented societies, Bauman sees this rational and rational approach to problem-solving as a means of obtaining victims' cooperation in modern societies as a whole.

In his book Modernity and the Holocaust (1989), Bauman argued that the Holocaust should not be seen as just a Jewish tragedy. According to Bauman, the Holocaust was a product of modernity and an important component of modernity. Anti-Semitism or irrational racism against Jews was not the only reason for the massacre of Jews (others) in Nazi Germany. According to Bauman, the Holocaust cannot be described in terms of anti-Semitism alone. He distinguishes racism and anti-Semitism from "heterophobia" and prejudice, and points out that anti-Semitism generally targets a group that is considered extraordinary outside the "normal" classification systems of society, culture and religion. Anti-Semitism became racist in the modern age, and the Jews became the center of anti-modern energy.

He argues that the Holocaust should be seen as a central event in contemporary history, rather than a one-off event that hints at a historic return to cruelty. It is based on the technical and organizational achievements of an industrial bureaucratic society. The basis of modernity is the existence of nation-states with clearly defined boundaries. In European governments, Jews were viewed as 'insider foreigners'. According to Bauman, the presence of Jewish 'otherness' in pre-modern Europe did not prevent Jews from integrating into mainstream social order. The Jews were a special group in modern society, and they were segregated into nations. In order to generate national sentiment, modern nation-states emphasize the unity of a nation.

The cultural scheme and methods of social action that emerged from the Enlightenment and the process of modernization are called modernity. It is a set of logical procedures and laws for new and "man-made" human societies. Subjectivity and personality, the spirit of rational public culture, rationalization of economic activity, bureaucracy in administrative management, self-discipline and democratization in the public sphere, and other interrelated dimensions of modernity can be roughly categorized as "intellectual" and "institutional".

After researching the Holocaust, Bauman began to wonder if modern forms of social organization and reason, which have been described as indicators of human progress, actually undermine moral obligation and responsibility. In addition to being a brutal counter-example to modern morality, the Holocaust was consistent with many modern rational principles that were considered morally desirable in most other contexts. Modern ideas such as instrumental reasoning, the observance of laws, the regulation and classification of all aspects of social life, and the complex division of labor have all led to massive extinction.

Advances in science and industry technology, which are also a feature of modern society, help to widen the gap between actors and victims, which allows for the elimination of 'moral responsibility'. 'Task splitting', 'especially modern type of power-ability,' and 'language of technology' are considered important in this. The Holocaust was made possible by modern industrial and bureaucratic models, made possible by the machinery of the industry. By discussing Weber's work on rationalization, he illustrates how a pattern of reasoning can lead to Holocaust terror. The Holocaust is an example of what a contemporary industrial organization can lead to.

Examining the history of each case helps to explain where and how genocidal governments came to power, and the examination of political institutions and structures helps to understand the variables that serve as barriers to modern genocide. However, it is not only political forces that are blocking another Holocaust in modern civilization. His comprehensible and persuasive argument focuses on the mobilizing and coordinating skills of the bureaucratic administration, as well as the considerable efficiency of the work that emerges from the influence of the bureaucracy on individual morality. Modern nations not only have pluralistic democratic political systems, they also have economic pluralism, where workers are free to change jobs and bargain for better wages, and autonomous corporations, each with its own separate bureaucracy, compete with state-controlled enterprises.

Modern government has complete control over coercive means, making the public defenseless. This may be true, but if it helps the Nazi control of the monopoly of violence, it does not prove that they used the same compulsion as the ordinary modern nations, albeit on a larger scale, or used force in the same way in representation.

Instead of relying on the fears of a secret police and concentration camps, compulsion under the modern regime will generally employ the military and police. In democracies, the possibility of sanctions is used to encourage individuals to follow the law, while in repressive regimes, the threat of violence is used to intimidate people into following prescribed behavior.

Central to Bauman's analysis is the fact that the 'bureaucratic culture' of modern society has created precise circumstances that undermine 'moral prohibitions against violence'. Modern civilization, in Bauman's opinion, is based on state-centered coercion of violence hidden from view "in a peaceful, humane, legal and orderly society." 'The dominant image of civilized society is nonviolent; One with kindness, courtesy and gentleness. 'This concentration of force leads to a 'compliance with authority' that goes hand in hand with the culture of bureaucratic science, allowing the state to seize control of the lives of the people.

Fragmentation and discontinuity

According to Bauman, fragmentation, continuity, and irrelevance are the hallmarks of modern society. Primarily, jobs are taken into account for one's survival. It may be temporary or permanent today. However, one of the risks is that the job and the factories, offices or bank branches that provide it will disappear without warning. Even the skills needed for jobs are rapidly deteriorating and assets are being turned into liabilities overnight.

It's more difficult to think about the future because it's not about accumulating skills that may be less in demand tomorrow, or saving money that may lose most of its purchasing power tomorrow. In such a world it is reasonable and prudent not to plan long-term plans or invest in the future. It is impossible to predict the attractiveness of today's tempting goals or the value of today's properties. The world

seems less resilient than ever. It lost the unity and continuity that existed when the diverse areas of life were intertwined and formed into a meaningful whole.

Time is divided into episodes, each with a beginning and an end, but no history or future; there is no logical connection between the episodes, and even their sequence is suspiciously random; Whether or not there is a logical connection between the episodes. In other words, our environment is characterized by fragmentation, dissociation, and irrelevance.

Today's society confirms what we learn from our own life experiences. It depicts a series of pieces and episodes of the world, with one film running away and replacing the previous, only another film minutes later. Celebrities keep coming and going, leaving only a few marks.

Bauman talks about 'morality and ethics' in today's world. In his contributions to morality, there is a clear distinction between morality and ethics. Morality refers to the qualities of human knowledge, emotion, and behavior that are related to people's ability to distinguish between right and wrong. Rather, morality is a combination of culturally embedded rules, regulations, and norms.

Bauman argues that sociologists are mistaken in thinking that society provides a code of ethics that prevents evil and eliminates ambiguity. According to Bauman, individuals must have a moral motivation that is persecuted or controlled by the social processes of modernity. As a result, the focus of morality is on adhering to a code that is ambiguous and non-apocalyptic. Morality precedes society and exists independent of human purpose and agency: 'I am moral before I think,' Bauman claims, which is itself the first reality.

He also emphasizes the need for moral responsibility in today's world. Taking a moral stand that implies taking responsibility for another; I work in the belief that the well-being of others is a valuable resource and my work is needed to protect and improve it. It makes no difference whether I deserve my attention or somehow return it or do what the other person does.

In today's world, there is no justification for cold storage or the moral obligation to lend or mortgage. It is hard to imagine a stage where one could claim with any moral authority that "I did my part and my responsibility ends here".

According to Bauman, morality revolves around issues of inclusion and exclusion; Inclusion is the duty to moralize the world, but shockingly, given the primary theme of modernity and the Holocaust, exclusion is central to the maintenance of any social formation. Modern man's life is usually compared to a journey through time. The routes of the pilgrims are planned in advance based on the destination they want to reach, and everything they do is calculated to help them get closer to their destination. This is the ideal vision of a job, of an identity, in the life of modern man.

One can only plan one's life as a journey to a destination in a world, and one can reasonably expect their chart to remain the same or make a small change in their lifetime - it does not exist now. Instead, the lives of men and women of our time are like those of tourists throughout history: they cannot plan in advance which places they will visit or which stations they will visit. All they know is that they are moving, not knowing where they will end up.

They are more likely to see each place as a temporary residence, primarily on the basis of the pleasures derived from it; however, they may be willing to move if satisfaction is low. It downplays the moral importance of even the most

personal interactions. As a result, it excludes the fundamental aspects of human interaction from moral evaluation. This is not a situation that moral preachers can resolve, nor can moral preachers resolve in the case of immoral moral judgments and responsible execution of the former kind. It has deep roots in the lives of modern men and women, reflecting a form of 'logical adaptation' to the circumstances in which they live.

Conclusion

Bauman has established himself as one of the most influential European and, in particular, British sociologists, as well as one of the most important interpreters of our current era, a time that has become a shapeless mass prone to constant and relentless change because his work is marked by the ability to negotiate new social problems and forms.

His most well-known concept in liquid modernity. It is characterized by individual unpredictability and fragmentation in a globalized, capitalist world that alters as a result of technological change. This is neither the modern nor the postmodern era; rather, this age is best described as liquid modernity: a concept capable of focusing on the modifications that affect human life in terms of general policy decisions.

MODULE II

CULTURE AND SOCIETY

Raymond William

Introduction

Raymond Williams (1921-1988) was a writer, scholar, cultural theorist, literary critic, public intellectual, socialist, and New Left personality. He was the son of working-class parents from a Welsh border village, an adult education instructor, a Cambridge professor, and was and wasn't a Marxist, according to Terry Eagleton. He constructed a new form of critical analysis, cultural materialism, based on a concept of culture that recognizes cultural practice as part of an active, dynamic, historical process, from such unique positions.

Raymond William was a pioneer in the field of cultural studies. Culture and Society 1780-1950 (1958) and The Long Revolution (1961) helped to define much of what is now considered the core subject area of cultural studies, as well as shaping the notion of culture that underpins such studies. While Williams' work is crucial for understanding the history of cultural studies, it is also somewhat outside the mainstream of the discipline in other ways.

Williams became more interested in the mass media in the 1960s and early 1970s. While Williams presents the mass media as a threat to the democratic revolution and the creation of a "common culture" in his early books, he gradually shifts away from this perspective in Communications (1962) and Televisions: Technology and Cultural Forms (1965). While Williams' early approach is heavily influenced by American media research, as opposed

to the more theoretical approaches that would come to the fore, for example, in the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, his later approach is heavily influenced by the influence of American media research. Williams' description of his first interaction with American television, and hence the collapse of a series of discrete programmes into a "flow," has been extensively quoted.

Williams offered a prescient analysis of "nomad capitalism" in Towards 2000 (1983), published five years before his death, and dubbed "Plan X" the political and economic project of social management now commonly known as neoliberalism; for Williams, this was a new form of capitalism that aimed to "grasp" and "control" the future. He envisioned a formidable alternative centered on the disarmament, environmental, and feminist movements. Of course, the cultural practice would play a defining role, and Williams' methodological approach offers a radical sort of critical analysis, one that emphasizes the material processes and relationships that makeup culture.

History of cultural materialism

Cultural materialism's, theoretical perspective and research methods developed in the late 1960s and expanded in the 1980s. Marvin Harris' 1968 book *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* was the first to establish and promote cultural materialism in the field of anthropology. Harris developed a theory of how culture and cultural goods fit into the larger social system based on Marx's idea of base and superstructure. He claimed that technology, economic output, the built environment, and other factors influence both the structure and the superstructure of society. He claimed that understanding why cultures differ from place to place and group to group, as well as why items like art and consumer goods are generated in a specific place and context

for those who use them, requires taking into account the entire system.

Later, in the 1980s, Welsh scholar Raymond Williams expanded on the theoretical paradigm and research approach, assisting in the formation of the area of cultural studies. Williams' cultural materialism aimed at how cultural products relate to a class-based system of dominance and oppression, embracing Marx's political nature and critical focus on power and class structure. Williams developed his theory of cultural materialism by drawing on previous critiques of the relationship between culture and power, such as Italian scholar Antonio Gramsci's writings and Frankfurt School critical theory.

Williams claimed that culture is a generative activity, meaning that it gives rise to the intangibles that exist in civilizations, such as ideas, assumptions, and social relations. Cultural materialism, according to his thesis, is a part of the greater process of how class structures are formed and social injustice is fostered. The promotion of generally held beliefs, ideas, and worldviews, as well as the marginalization of people who do not fit the dominant mold, are how cultures play these roles.

Cultural Materialism

Cultural Materialism was coined by Raymond Williams to express a theoretical fusion of Marxist analysis with leftist culturalism. Williams stressed the importance of culture in terms of its material value. Culture is a living experience for him. It is made up of the meanings created by ordinary men and women, the participants' lived experiences and the texts and activities that all people engage in as they go about their daily lives.

Material conditions do not exempt culture. This viewpoint differs from views that emphasize ideas,

aesthetics, and cultural values while viewing material culture as a byproduct of economic and technical processes. According to cultural materialism, culture is neither an abstract and idealistic thing nor a reflection of economic forces and interactions. Culture is made up of texts that are created and consumed as a result of social processes and the lifestyles of distinct groups.

As a result, culture is a tangible thing. Culture is said to as material since it is solidified in some forms as a result of industrial and social activities. As a result, the programmes that are broadcast on television have an impact on society. Furthermore, we can say that a television set is a material thing that is placed in both private and public locations in a somewhat different meaning. In this way, it is a part of the living room's décor and meaning as an item; in fact, the rest of the décor is constructed around it.

This hypothesis also has to do with the historical records that are being studied. Cultural materialists studied how hegemonic forces in society seized control of historically significant books such as Shakespeare and Austen and utilized them to justify or impose particular ideas on the cultural imaginary. Traditional Marxism's class-based theory is complemented by a focus on the underprivileged. The goal of cultural materialists is to draw attention to the methods employed by current power structures such as the church and the state to disseminate ideology. The historical context of work, as well as its political implications, are investigated to accomplish this. The dominating hegemonic position is then noted based on in-depth textual research. Cultural materialism, according to Raymond Williams, was a development of Marx's historical materialism theory. Cultural production, like any other human activity, is material. Culture must be regarded both as a separate entity and as a component of society.

The three levels of a social system, according to cultural materialism, are as follows:

Infrastructure - Infrastructure refers to how civilization interacts with its immediate surroundings. It also involves how society's necessities are addressed, as well as the resources required. Labor, equipment, and technology are only a few examples.

Structure- Structure refers to how society is organised in terms of business, politics, and social conduct. For instance, consider the government or an educational institution.

Superstructure- The ideology that dominates a given era is referred to as the superstructure. It is typically made up of social institutions. For instance, law, religion, politics, and so on.

The social system's three tiers are all interconnected. It means that if something changes at one level, it will affect other levels as well, even if the change isn't visible right away. Infrastructure is the foundation for all other levels of change. It encompasses how society's basic requirements are met and how it interacts with the surrounding environment. When infrastructure changes, the structure, and superstructure change as well, although this is a slow process.

Although cultural materialism is based on Marxist theory, there are some deviations. Only the ruling class benefits from the societal change, according to Marxist materialism. Cultural materialism, on the other hand, thinks that social transformation helps both the governing and working classes. Furthermore, according to cultural materialism, society operates on a hit-or-miss basis, with organizations that are not valuable to society eventually fading away and those that are beneficial remaining.

Marxists, in contrast to cultural materialists, hold that production is a material situation in the base that acts on and is responded upon by infrastructure. Furthermore, while Marxist theory proposes that production is a material condition at the bottom of society that engages in a reciprocal relationship with societal structure, acting on and being acted upon by the infrastructure sector, cultural materialism proposes that production is contained within the infrastructure and that the infrastructure-structure relationship is unidirectional.

As a result, cultural materialists consider the infrastructure-structure link as primarily one-way, whereas Marxists see it as reciprocal. Cultural materialism varies from Marxism in that it does not include a class theory. Cultural materialism tackles unequal power relations by recognizing inventions or changes that help both the top and bottom classes, whereas Marxism says that culture change only favours the ruling class. Even though both cultural materialism and Marxism propose that culture change is the consequence of innovations chosen by society as a result of advantageous gains in productive capabilities, cultural materialism does not anticipate culture change. Although both cultural materialism and Marxism propose that culture change is the outcome of innovations chosen by society as a result of beneficial advances in productive capabilities, cultural materialism does not anticipate the final utopian form that Marxism envisions. Williams wants Marxism to reconsider its cultural theory, moving away from the base-superstructure argument and toward a more dynamic, less hierarchical form of culture.

The central question addressed by this theory was how to comprehend the link between society and culture. Williams considered culture to be a whole way of life. The arts were a part of a social structure that was drastically

influenced by economic upheaval. Because the social processes addressed by political analysis are ingrained in the culture, culture is considered as being political. Culture is viewed as a holistic way of existence that encompasses all aspects of human life, and political analysis is the framework through which it can be comprehended. He proposed that cultural analysis should look into and examine the recorded culture of a location at a specific time. The 'structure of feeling,' or shared values and outlook, can be reconstructed in this way.

Culture, according to Williams, is understood via the representations and practices of everyday life. Furthermore, this must be done in the context of cultural material conditions and production. Cultural materialism, according to Raymond Williams. Culture, in his opinion, should be examined in terms of the following elements:

i. Institutions of artistic and cultural production, such as artisanal or market forms

ii. Formations or schools, movements, and factions of cultural production

iii. Modes of production, such as relations between material means of cultural production and the cultural forms that are made manifest

iv. Identifications and forms of culture, such as the specificity of cultural products

v. Identifications and forms of culture, such as the specificity of cultural products

vi. The transmission of a selective heritage of meanings and behaviours across time and location, involving both social order and social change.

vii. The 'selective tradition' is organized in terms of a 'realized signifying system.'

This method can be applied to current music, as well as the imagery and activities that go along with it. Rave, Rap, and Hip-hop, for example, can be thought of as popular music formations created inside the institutions of record labels and advertising agencies. The technical aspects of popular music creation, such as studio recording, as well as capitalist social relations, will be involved. As a result, Rave or Hip-hop are musical genres that involve a specific arrangement of sounds, phrases, and pictures that are associated with distinct social groupings. This method analyses the precise structuring of sounds and signs as a signifying system. This is comparable to the way Hip-hop, for example, reproduces and alters features of African-American musical traditions while also preserving the values of its historically evolved lived culture.

Cultural materialism considers culture to be a constructive process linked to society's racial disparities. Cultural materialism draws on previous theoretical critiques of the relationship between culture and power, particularly the ideas of Italian neo-Marxist academic Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School's critical theory of modern culture. The goal of cultural materialists is to draw attention to the methods employed by current power structures such as the church and the state to disseminate ideology. Culture, according to Williams, is understood via the representations and practices of everyday life. Furthermore, this must be done in the context of cultural material conditions and production.

Conclusion

Williams says of cultural materialism "A theory of the specificities of material, cultural, and literary production within historical materialism,". In the 1980s, Williams' attempt to identify a connection between language, literature, historiography, communications, feminist

theories, political science, and other disciplines spawned the field of Cultural Studies. Media studies, social criticism, ethnography, and literary theory are all included in the field of cultural studies. It examines the rapidly expanding global culture industry, which encompasses a wide range of cultural categories such as entertainment, advertising, publishing, television, film, computers, and the Internet, as well as the shrinking differences between these realms of expression and the politics and ideology that enable contemporary culture.

Roland Barthes

Life sketch

Barthes was born on November 12, 1915, in the northwestern French harbor city of Cherbourg, to Louis and Henriette Barthes. A few weeks before Barthes turned one, his father, a navy lieutenant, was killed in battle in the North Sea. Barthes was up in Bayonne, a coastal town near Spain's southwestern border, where he was nurtured by his mother and maternal grandmother in a genteel poverty-environment. Barthes traveled to Paris with his mother in 1924, where he showed great intellectual promise as a student. He contracted pulmonary TB at the age of 19, while studying for the admission exams to the École Normale Supérieure, and spent the next two years in and out of Sanitoria.

In 1950, Barthes moved to Paris, where he worked at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique on lexicology and sociology research. He became Director of Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in 1962. On February 25, 1980, Barthes was hit by a laundry van in Paris and died a month later from his injuries.

The renowned essay "The Death of the Author" (1967) by Roland Barthes is a meditation on the author-reader rules in the construction of meaning as mediated through the text.

The central point of Roland Barthes is that the author has no control over his own words, images, sounds, or other media, which belong to the reader who interprets them. When we encounter a literary text, we should question ourselves not what the author intended with his words, but what the words themselves truly convey, according to Barthes. Texts use symbols that readers decipher, and since the purpose of the text is to be read, the author and writing process are immaterial.

"The death of the author" implies that meaning is not something that is retrieved or discovered after it has been present all along, but rather something that emerges spontaneously during the action rather than the passive act of reading work. Barthes does not want to imply that an author's death allows any reader to read any book in any way he or she wishes. What Barthes is implying is that reading always entails some writing or rewriting of the meaning of the text.

"The Death of the Author," by Roland Barthes, is an attack on traditional literary criticism, which focuses too much on retracing the author's intentions and original meaning. Instead, Barthes suggests that we take a more text-oriented approach, focusing on the reader's connection with it rather than the writer's. This implies that the text is far more open to interpretation, and its meaning is far more fluid than previously assumed.

Many of Roland Barthes' writings are concerned with literature. Barthes, on the other hand, denied being a literary critic because he did not evaluate or pass judgment on works. Instead, he deciphered their semiotic meaning. To the displeasure of established literary techniques, Barthes' structuralist style of literary analysis has affected cultural studies.

Barthes' statement of the "death of the author" has been a source of contention. This 'death' is directed at the idea of the auteur as a creative genius expressing an inner vision, rather than the idea of writing. He is arguing against the idea of works representing the author's personality. Barthes is adamantly opposed to the idea that authors make masterpieces on purpose. He claims that authors such as Racine and Balzac frequently repeat emotional patterns about which they are unaware. He disagrees with the idea that authors should be judged on what they think they're accomplishing. Their biographies have no bearing on what they write, any more than scientists' biographies do.

According to Roland Barthes, writing eliminates all voices and points of origin. This is because it occurs as part of a functional process that is the practice of signifying. Its true source is language. As a result, a writer is a kind of craftsman who is adept in employing a specific code, rather than having a special brilliance displayed in the text. All authors, like copywriters or scribes, inscribe a specific linguistic zone.

Language, not the author, is the true source of a text. It is only the dictionary that the writer carries ready-formed if the writer says something "inner." The ability of a storyteller to interpret linguistic structures or codes into specific narratives or messages is a unique skill. Each text is made up of numerous texts that are brought together in conversation, with each code referring to a preceding civilization.

Barthes' argument is intended at literary criticism schools that strive to reveal the author's meaning as a hidden referent that determines the text's final meaning. Refusing to assign an ultimate meaning to the text, and so refusing to settle its meaning, is equivalent to refusing to assign an ultimate meaning to the text.

It becomes receptive to various interpretations. The unity of a text, according to Barthes, is found in its goal rather than its origin. Its variety is centered on the reader as an absent point within the text to whom it communicates. The writer and the reader are linguistic, not psychological, individuals. Their place in the story is determined by their coded position in speech, not by their characteristics.

A text cannot have a single meaning; rather, it is made up of various systems that are used to produce it. In the case of Roland Barthes, this entails reading texts through the signs they employ, both in terms of their organization within the text and their broader implications.

Literature does not represent reality since what it refers to does not exist. It works for Barthes by using the various systems of language use and their unlimited transcribability-their ability to be written in a variety of ways.

The author's death frees the reader to interpret the work in their way. By connecting to the text's meanings as they appear in diverse situations, the reader can recreate the text. Barthes criticizes reading and criticizing methods that rely on features of an author's identity to extract meaning from their work. The author's experiences and biases serve as a conclusive "explanation" of the text in this form of critique, which he opposes. However, for Barthes, this way of reading, while seemingly neat and convenient, is ultimately sloppy and flawed: "Assigning an author to a work" and a single, related interpretation "imposes a limit on the text." This style of reading, according to Barthes, appears clean and convenient but is sloppy and flawed: "To assign a single, corresponding interpretation to a text is to put a restriction on that text."

To free a text from interpretive tyranny, readers must remove a literary work from its creator. Each piece of writing is multi-layered and has various meanings. Barthes makes an

analogy between text and textiles in a well-known passage, saying that a "text is a tissue of quotes," collected from "innumerable centers of culture," rather than from a single, personal experience. The reader's impressions, not the writer's "passions" or "tastes," determine the work's primary meaning; "a text's wholeness rests not in its origins," or its author, "but in its destination," or its audience.

The author is no longer the center of creative impact, but rather a "scriptor." The scriptor "is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as a predicate," and "is not the subject with the book as a predicate." With each re-reading, every work is "eternally written here and now," because the "origin" of meaning is solely in "language itself" and its impacts on the reader.

Myth and society

Barthes' intellectual life was devoted to the study of ideology and how it functions. Recognizing that bourgeois ideology represented the economic interests of the ruling class, he sought to demonstrate that doxa, or common sense, was encoded in and perpetuated by cultural messaging. While literary language piqued Barthes' interest, cultural messaging encompassed any verbal or visual indicators that transmitted meaning and, thus, ideology. Barthes' most well-known work on the subject was Mythologies, a collection of short articles initially published in 1957. Mythologies is a collection of 53 pieces written by Roland Barthes between 1954 and 1956 as columns for the literary journal Les Lettresnouvelles. He decoded the philosophy behind seemingly innocuous activities, artifacts, and events by looking into topics as diverse as detergent, toys, and plastic. "Myth Today," a longer, more typical scholarly piece, was also published in Mythologies.

Roland Barthes' work included a variety of issues, including the sociology of signs, symbols, and communal representations. In his book Mythologies, Roland Barthes conducts a semiotic analysis of well-known cultural objects in the French community, such as steak and chips, wrestling, and even soap powder and detergents, uncovering the symbolic value of these objects about their claim of universality, and at times discovering that some objects retain significations associated with the bourgeoisie and capitalist curiosities. He settles on the term "myths" to describe the cultural significance of these things.

The study of myth, as defined by Roland Barthes, is frequently carried out within the field of semiotics, which is defined as a way of investigation into the implicit signs present in the mental element of interaction with nature or within a community. To this purpose, the semiological analysis might be defined as the study of meanings found in our everyday communication and signification systems. Semiotics is concerned with the general theory of signification, in which the semiotician constructs models of the conditions of meaning creation and reception.

The purring of a cat to show its happiness, the signature as a sign of acceptance, or the image of Marx as a sign of socialism are all examples of semiotics. Outside of our logocentric logic, often known as our informal use of language, such relationships are frequently internalized. Like language, the strength of such indicators is that they alter some parts of our perception of a particular topic, indirectly influencing individual or group approaches and ideas in respect to a given subject matter.

Barthes builds on Ferdinand De Saussure's semiotics school, in which the building blocks of semiotics are found in a dyadic model of (1) the signified; "the "something" that is meant by the person who uses the sign", (2) The signifier;

the mediator that is employed to infer the signified; and the sign is made up of these two elements. When dealing with the signifier, one can deduce the signified. For instance, consider the term "cool." What might the signified be if we take the uttered word "cool" as a signifier? Cool may refer to temperature in one context or environment.

In another context, it could refer to something that is 'stylish' or 'popular.' Over time and in different circumstances, the relationship between signifier and signified can shift. As a result, myths are signs that are embedded in our signification systems and communicated in communication, and their study allows us to explain how certain social symbols form into the fabric of collective consciousness.

Myths are produced by adding a "meaning" to a "shape" as second-level systems of signification. Typically, the form is blank, such as a legal structure, a symbolic connection to an institution, or a natural occurrence. This construction, unlike first-level semiotic exchanges, frequently contains explicit or implicit intentions. However, because myths are vague, such reasons are frequently splintered. The motive does not appear when the myth is read, in hindsight, since the myth freezes this coupling of meaning and form. In effect, myths appear natural because they implicitly assume the duty of providing a natural justification or explanation for a historical goal.

Myths, in effect, appear natural because they implicitly undertake the work of providing a natural justification for a historical goal or of "making contingency appear eternal." As a result, myth depoliticizes discourse and eliminates "the intricacy of human acts." Nonetheless, myths corrupt the first-level signification linkages by adding another layer of meaning to the form, rather than hiding them from our awareness. On a related note, met language, which is defined

as the action of description, is the outcome of the internalization of myths and other connotative second-order semiotic structures in our way of thinking, and it is a component of met language.

On a related note, met language, which is defined as the action of description, is the outcome of the internalization of myths and other connotative second-order semiotic structures in our way of thinking, representing at some level a part of the collective consciousness of a given group. The components of our shared met language have been amplified by the globalization of media.

Myths can be used to interpret a normative judgment; for example, arbitration tribunals frequently appear to be based on the presumption that the investor's goal is to maximize wealth, as expressed by the shareholder value rule. The shareholder value rule, which states that the corporation's goal is to maximize profits in the best interests of its shareholders, is largely driven by market forces and lacks a normative foundation.

The form is the normative structure's claim to legitimacy, the meaning is profit maximization, and the motivation is liberal economics or more explicit concepts of the invisible hand of the market. The legitimacy of some regulations, on the other hand, can be perceived as myths. Furthermore, cultural and political myth play a role in constructing the legal episteme and, as a result, legal discourses, particularly given the current proliferation of myths aided by the overproduction of 'fast-food' knowledge conveyed in the media, as 'myth is speech justified in excess.'

This myth takes the shape of a media with animated TV characters as metalanguage. This apparent meaning is overlooked within the overall experience of entertainment television in the context of The Simpsons cartoon show. The

myth's expression appears natural, but its purpose is historical and ideological. The method of myth analysis has to start with some ideological assumptions being observed. Then there's the phenomenon's uniqueness, which suggests that the formula should be used.

While this may appear to be a complicated idea at first glance, as an applied theory, it presents a technique for tracing myth's power through its more fundamental structural interconnections rather than assuming those linkages or associations. "Myth hides nothing: its duty is to distort, not to make disappear," writes Roland Barthes. Myth, like the denotative sign, is the most evident level of signification, yet it distorts meaning by validating arbitrary cultural beliefs.

Connotation and myth both function as cultural codes that can be deciphered via semiotic analysis. Signs are structured into relationships that code systems of signs to produce meaning in everyday language and picture use. The meanings enshrined in a cultural text are organized according to the convention. The context of signification, which manifests in ideological representations within a narrative structure, is crucial to understanding the form that transmits myth.

As Barthes demonstrates, myth is primarily concerned with making an immediate impact, and reading is myth "exhausted in one stroke." To understand a myth, all one has to do is consider its form and meaning in connection to the context in which it was created and disseminated, while keeping the question of its motive in mind. Deciphering myth lends itself to history, according to Barthes, because it allows one to reflect on current conceptions that claim to be "natural" and "universal" despite their origins.

He discovers that many of the cultural symbols he examined have embedded connotations that normalize

bourgeois reasoning, capitalism's rule, and empire, as seen on the cover of Paris-match, as meaning flows out of these myths "until their very name becomes unnecessary," as seen on the cover of Paris-match. In that they normalize history as reality, myths are in some ways the consequence of power struggles. The prevalence of such myths in international law is astounding since it has served as a consolidating ground for myths of liberalism and imperialism, among other things.

The purpose of myth analysis is to show how communication works. The random nature of communication is always maintained by the meanings that arise. However, in the complex surroundings of mass media, the ideological implications of cultural mythology are particularly troublesome. This method identifies the structures that underpin assumptions received within a cultural context, the history that, as Barthes observed, defies the nature of occurrences. Myth analysis aims to redirect our emphasis from the obvious and apparent meanings to the environment that produces meanings because myth makes itself so evident as real. Only when media literacy information is available. The shape of those messages will be updated to match the growing consciousness only when media literacy informs society to critically interpret media. The shape of those messages will be updated to match the growing consciousness only when media literacy informs society to critically interpret media.

Conclusion

Barthes' views were influential in the creation of several schools of thought, including structuralism, semiotics, social theory, design theory, anthropology, and post-structuralism. He was most recognized for expanding and advancing the discipline of semiotics through the study of a wide range of sign systems, most of which were borrowed from Western popular culture.

Barthes' style is characterized by the use of a large number of words to describe a small number of concepts. He dissects brief words, paragraphs, and single images to figure out how they work. His continual systematization is another feature of his work. He creates classification schemes for the signs and codes he works with, which can be used to split a text, a narrative, or a myth into distinct pieces with various functions. He creates something akin to a blueprint of the conversation areas he researches, demonstrating how the many components go together.

Jacques Derrida

Life sketch

Derrida was born on July 15, 1930, into a Sephardic Jewish family in El-Biar (a suburb of Algiers), Algeria. Many of Derrida's publications are autobiographical due to his interest in autobiography. The Vichy regime in France declared some restrictions on Algerian native languages, particularly Berber. Derrida describes his "interdiction" experience as "unforgettable and generalizable." The Vichy regime's "Jewish regulations" forced him to drop out of high school.

Derrida began studying philosophy shortly after World War II ended. He relocated to Paris in 1949. In one of the many eulogies he composed for his generation's members. Derrida enrolled at the École Normale during a pivotal moment in the development of a generation of philosophers and thinkers. There was also Foucault, Althusser, Lyotard, Barthes, and Marin, in addition to Deleuze, Still alive were Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Ricur, Blanchot, and Levinas.

In France, the 1950s were phenomenological, and Derrida examined Husserl's published writings as well as some of the archival material available at the time. Insofar as

Derrida emphasizes the problem of language in Husserl's idea of history, his introduction appears to be a radically new view of Husserl.

For this generation of French thinkers, the 1960s were a decade of extraordinary achievement. Derrida attentively examines Heidegger and Levinas in the early 1960s. Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, a recently available lecture course from 1964-1965, allows us to observe how Derrida developed his queries to Heidegger. In 1964, Derrida publishes "Violence and Metaphysics," a two-part essay on Levinas. It's difficult to tell which of Jacques Derrida's early pieces is the most important, but "Violence and Metaphysics" have to be a contender.

Derrida's "annus mirabilis" occurs in 1967, when he simultaneously publishes three books: Writing and Difference, Voice and Phenomenon, and Of Grammatology. In all three, Derrida mentions the term "deconstruction" to define his purpose. The term quickly spreads and begins to define Derrida's philosophy. It has come to be associated with a nonsensical and imprecise style of writing and thinking. It's worth noting that Derrida's writing style contributed not only to his enormous popularity but also to the intense hostility he elicited from some. His writing style is frequently literary rather than philosophical, and so evocative rather than persuasive.

Derrida worked hard to perfect his writing style. The best example is his 1974 Glas, in which Derrida writes in two columns, one for a reading of Hegel and the other for a reading of the French novelist playwright Jean Genet.

Derrida borrows Heidegger's concept of a call. Derrida devoted many writings to Heidegger's theory, beginning with "The Ends of Man" in 1968. But it was with the publication of The Truth in Painting in 1978, and then throughout the 1980s, that Derrida's reading of Heidegger

became more intense. He wrote a series of writings on Heidegger's sex or race issues, in particular. These works, while frequently critical, frequently reveal new insights into Heidegger's ideas. Derrida's 1992 Aporias is the final essay in his Heidegger trilogy.

Even though Derrida's extensive study on Husserl and phenomenology was limited to the late 1960s and the publication of Voice and Phenomenon in 1967, this one book sparked several objections of his Husserl reading. J. Claude Evans' 1991 book Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice is one of the most prominent.

Although Derrida only mentioned Husserl in passing throughout his career, he included a chapter on him in his Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy. His 1971 talk to a communication conference in Montreal, "Signature Event Context," is one of the instances where he discusses Husserl. In 1972, he included this paper as the final chapter of his book Margins of Philosophy. While "Signature Event Context" includes a brief discussion of Husserl, it is Austin's speech act theory that is the center of the book. Both Husserl's phenomenology and Austin's speech act theory remove quotations from the sphere of meaningfulness or the performative, according to Derrida.

Derrida taught at the École Normale throughout the 1960s after being invited by Hyppolite and Althusser. He joined the École des Hautes Études in Sciences Sociales in Paris in 1983 as "Director of Studies" in "Philosophical Institutions," a position he will occupy until his death. Derrida worked in many American universities, including Johns Hopkins University and Yale University, beginning in the 1970s.

Derrida's work in the 1990s progressed in two directions at the same time, which tend to interact and overlap: politics and religion. Derrida's 1989 "Force of Law"

was arguably the first time these two directions were seen. However, in his 1993 book Specters of Marx, Derrida argued that, despite globalization, a deconstructed Marxist theory is still relevant to today's society, and that a deconstructed Marxism consists of a new messianism, a messianism of a "democracy to come." Although Derrida was nearing the end of his life, he created some intriguing works in the 1990s and early 2000s.

In 2003, Derrida was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, which limited his speaking and travel opportunities. In the early hours of October 9, 2004, he died after surgery in a Paris hospital.

Deconstruction as a method

The term "deconstruction" is derived from the French verb "deconstuire," which means "to undo the progress or growth of, to dismantle." In philosophy, however, the term "deconstruction" was invented in the late 1960s by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) in response to Martin Heidegger's German word "destruktion," which literally means "destruction" or "de-building." As a result, the term "deconstruction" can be traced back to Heidegger. Derrida chose the term "deconstruction" instead of Heidegger's destruktion (destruction) to describe textual readings.

Deconstruction is a theory about language and literature that emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the primacy of French structuralism and a repressive academic and intellectual system that forcibly enforced a single and definitive reading of literary texts. Deconstruction is a philosophical and theological term that refers to Jacques Derrida's careful investigation of language in philosophical and religious texts. Deconstruction is best known for its concept of textuality, or a perspective of language as it appears not only in books but also in speech, history, and

society, particularly written language. There was "nothing outside the text" for Derrida.

Many definitions of deconstruction have been offered by Jacques Derrida. As if the Western intellectual tradition were monolithic and uniform, Derrida speaks of "metaphysics." He also uses the term "Platonism" in the same way as Nietzsche did. Simply put, deconstruction is a critique of Platonism, which holds that existence is structured in terms of oppositions that are hierarchical, with one side of the opposition being more valued than the other.

The first phase of deconstruction attacks this belief by reversing the Platonistic hierarchies: the hierarchies between the invisible or intelligible and the visible or sensible; the hierarchies between essence and appearance; the soul and body; living memory and rote memory; voice and writing; and finally, good and evil. Let us limit ourselves to one specific opposition, the antagonism between appearance and essence, to comprehend deconstruction's "two phases."

Derrida contends that the binary opposition (speaking and/or writing) through which structuralist theorists of the postwar period claimed to find hidden meaning in language is not just reversed, but challenged from within. Deconstruction, according to Derrida, is not a method, methodology, or type of criticism. Deconstruction, according to Derrida, is a valuable tool for stating new things about a text. Derrida's attentive reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau elucidates the relationship between writing and language, which he identifies in the text with the term supplementation. As a result, writing can be considered a "perilous supplement."

A 'supplement' is something secondary, a sign of a sign that replaces previously substantial discourse. The text's meaning and representation are constantly being replaced by traces of new text. Derrida's deconstructive approaches are

concerned with the demolition of conceptual opposition and the dismantling of hierarchical thinking systems, which can then be re-inscribed within a different order of textual meaning. Deconstruction is the process of scouring a text for aporias, blind spots, or moments of self-contradiction that inadvertently reveal the conflict between rhetoric and logic, what the text says and what it means.

Deconstruction is conducted in two styles, according to Derrida in "Force of Law." These "two styles" do not match the "two phases" of deconstruction as defined above. On the one hand, there's the deconstruction technique known as genealogical deconstruction, which harkens back to the origins of a notion or theme. Derrida had spelled out the history of the concept of writing, for example, earlier in his career in 'Of Grammatology'. But now it's the history of justice that's at stake. The more formalistic or structural type of deconstruction, on the other hand, investigates a-historical contradictions.

Deconstruction, in other words, is the breakdown of cultural, philosophical, and institutional systems that begins with the text. Every system is a social construct, something put together, and building implies exclusions. Deconstruction hunts out the system's weak points or fissures, where it hides its incompleteness and inability to cohere as a self-contained whole. One can demolish the system by locating these locations and applying a form of power to them. All systems are distrusted in deconstruction.

Deconstruction sees language as a game of contrasts and develops a strategy for recognizing the strong influence that language plays in our thinking. For Derrida, "play" refers to the "disruption of presence," which he claims is the illusionary metaphysics of presence that underpins Western philosophical thought. The metaphysics of presence is based on the notions that being is exhibited by the presence of

bodies and things, that being is more present,' and that the definition of being excluded absence. To Saussure, Derrida claims that that which is absent constitutes being itself. The main goal of deconstruction is to dissect the text and bring out the behaviour of figurative language, after which the pieces are reassembled in a new form. Nietzsche is credited with teaching deconstruction how to dance by recognizing the metaphorical power of language and the world's joyful affirmation play.

Deconstruction dissects textual pieces, highlighting behaviour and figurative language, and reinterpreting the sign. It's a close reading, albeit a negative one, of the text. Derrida takes a double reading technique to the text. The goal isn't to demolish or replace traditional reading, but to demonstrate instances of textual self-contradiction. Deconstruction can only happen within the confines of a dominant interpretation, not from the outside. Deconstruction is a speculative endeavor that can be viewed solely in terms of relativism.

According to Saussure, a sign is made up of two parts: a signifier and a signified. The 'signifier' is the shape that the sign takes, and the 'signified' is the thought it refers to, according to linguists and literary scholars. Both the signifier (sound pattern) and the signified (idea) are completely psychological for Saussure. In the Western classical tradition of reason, a sign is a combination of a signifier and the signified, but Saussure concentrates on the language sign as a phonocentric privilege. Writing, according to Derrida, is distinct and secondary, relying on the sign system to establish meaning and representation. Writing, according to Saussure, is related to speech as the signifier and the signified, while Derrida disagrees, claiming that writing is a sign of a sign.

Structuralism, according to Derrida, was an empiricist reaction to the New Criticism movement's interpretative efforts, and it described referent meaning as the center of a symbolic system or structure. The aporias of structuralism, according to Derrida, are caused by Saussure's dyadic sign model (sign and signifier). He also takes issue with a tradition that presents a deterministic, simplistic picture of human meaning. The metaphor of generalized writing governs Derrida's critique. Writing is both the structure and the activity that allows language to be dynamic. Writing, according to Derrida, is separate from language.

Derrida casts doubt on Saussure's two-faced sign, which maintains a strict difference between signifier and signified. This opens up the potential of considering a notion that is signified in and of itself, an idea that is just present for thought, unrelated to a system of signifiers. Derrida coined the phrase "transcendental signified" to describe such an idea, which essentially means "no signifier." According to him, the entire history of the West bespeaks a "strong irrepressible longing" for such a signified, permanent order of being that would put a reassuring stop to the reference from sign to sign.

The transcendental signifier (Logos) has always had a specific relationship with presence for the West, according to Derrida. He says in Structure, Sign, and Play that all names connected to fundamentals have always meant a constant presence.

The signified, the meaning we attribute to the signifier, came to take on existence in its own right, according to Derrida's history of the sign in Western theology and philosophy. Derrida believes that the written text has value in and of itself. Attaching transcendental significance and ontological status to the referent of language, he claims, leads to "naive objectivism." The signified is considered to

be comprehensible and thinkable in the presence of the divine Logos in all of its vastness in the language (words in space). The desire to imbue the signified with transcendental significance is known as "logocentric metaphysics." It is necessary to first provide a general outline of structuralism hermeneutics to comprehend Derrida's logocentric critique.

According to Jacques Derrida, once a piece has been composed, the text takes on a life of its own. According to Derrida, the text can be viewed as a system of signs, with no extra-textual or extra-linguistic information to relate to. There was nothing except a jumble of signs 'out there.' Derrida's deconstructive reading style focuses on the text's rhetorical activities. The basis of deconstruction is the act of discovering rhetorical operations in the binary structure of philosophical texts. Derrida's criticism is focused on the use of writing as a supplement to speech. Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss have all praised speech over the written word. As a neologism of philosophy and theology, Derrida detected a remarkable tendency in Western history: the written word gets devalued while the spoken word is elevated.

This hierarchy of speech and writing, in which speech is the prior and privileged term, is called phonocentrism by Derrida. Phonocentrism considers language to be a clear representation of pure cognition that has little or no effect on the notion itself. Oral representation is the most similar to the ideal. Written language, with its materially evident indicators that can be reproduced at a distance from the original author, poses a risk of distorting the "original meaning."

Speech, rather than writing, comes closer to the goal of communicating thought and reason in a transparent manner. The Western metaphysics of presence is inextricably linked with phonocentrism, which "treats writing as a

representation of speech and places speech in a direct and natural relationship with meaning." The goal of speech as a representation of pure mind is predicated on the premise that such a pure idea exists in the philosophical text in the first place. The orientation towards an order of meaning, thought, truth, reason, logic, and the word, as it is conceived in existing in itself, as a foundation for 'truth' is known as 'logocentrism.'

Saussure gave Jacques Derrida (1977) a language theory that allowed him to challenge the historical definition of being as presence. Derrida initiated an attack on structuralism, which linked the meaning of the sign to the Western metaphysics of presence, at this time. Saussure's attitude toward favored spoken language above written language, according to Derrida, can be understood as faulty construction of the Western metaphysics of presence. Derrida uncovers a binary opposition between spoken and written language at the heart of Western metaphysics of presence, as well as the need to demolish a center antagonism between speech and writing. The primary actuality of speech, a sense that a speaker's presence is behind his words, is viewed as secondary, and writing is constantly reliant on it.

Derrida's objective is metaphysics (any science of presence). Any claim to be free of metaphysics, according to Derrida, is false since no one can transcend the limitations of language. Derrida goes on to say that the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the Freudian critique of self-presence, and Heidegger's assertion of metaphysics' destruction are all stuck in a vicious circle. This circle 'describes the shape of the relationship between the history of metaphysics and its dissolution'. This inescapability, according to Derrida, stems from the fact that philosophy is the only language available.

Saussure's language, according to Derrida, is a system of contrasts without positive concepts. Negative signifiers are used to form a system called language. Because of its link to something that it is not, from which it differs, and which cannot be present, a positive is generated when the negatives are combined. Différance allows meaning to emerge. For 'then meaning is present, and presence can only mean what it meant in Western metaphysics as a result of "différance," the constant deference of meaning.'

To describe the way in which meaning is formed through the play of differences between words, Derrida invented the term difference, which means a difference and an act of delay. Since the meaning of a word is always an act of contradiction with the meaning of other words, the meaning of a word is never fully presented to us, as the meanings of those words depend on the contradictions with the meanings of other words (as such); It is infinitely replaced by an infinitely long chain of meanings, each of which contains "signs" of the meanings on which it depends.

Derrida sees structuralism's ontological structure as a fixed origin, a center. This constant center has been given many names, including essence, existence, being, truth, God, and man. Derrida opposes the notion of a transcendental signifier or a center in the formation of language since it just confirms the West's faulty beliefs and sophistry, as well as the immediacy of presence in speech. This corresponds to Roland Barthes' work in 'The Death of the Author' (1967), in which Derrida and Foucault address the issue of authorship in various ways. "Today's writing has emancipated itself from the necessity of "expression," according to Foucault; it merely refers to itself, but it is not limited to the bounds of interiority."

Texts do not have to relate to external reality as metaphysically or onto theologically present in Derrida's

vocabulary. In answer to Derrida and Barthes, Foucault claims that if the author is truly dead, no discernible subjectivity arises from the authors or characters in an authored piece. The death of the author has become too absolute for Foucault, who is unconcerned with the genetic consequences of their statements. Derrida's concept of écriture is criticized by Foucault. According to Foucault, Derrida has 'transposed the factual traits of an author to transcendental anonymity,' There is no longer an author who writes, according to Derrida, but rather a jumble of indications pointing to an ever-shifting abyss. According to Derrida, writing is no longer done by a single author, but rather by a series of indicators pointing to an ever-shifting and delaying origin, as well as a perpetual division of meaning through the arch conditioning of différance.

According to Derrida, différance is an anarchic idea that allows language to exist as a play of signifiers. Différance is often what is involved in writing; thus broadens the concept of writing to include anything that breaks down the complete logic of a sign. All Western conceptual frameworks relied on one kind or another of a transcendental signifier before différance. Any metaphysical, hierarchical concept that presumes to define whether constructs are 'natural' or 'appropriate' is referred to as a transcendental signifier. Différance is an alternative to and a way out of the transcendental signifier's logic.

We are experiencing the present when we perceive the difference, yet the present is acknowledged as "polluted" by the past and future. The difference, to the extent that it is undecidable, destabilizes the original judgment that established the hierarchy. Derrida generally modifies the orthography of the formerly inferior term after redefinition, for example, writing "différence" with an "a" as "différance" to signify the shift in rank. The undecidable resource into

which "metaphysics" "cuts" to make its conclusion is referred to as différance.

Derrida refers to titles like "différance" as "old names" or "paleonyms" in "Positions," and he also provides a list of these "ancient terms": "pharmakon," "supplement," "trace," "hymen," "gramme," "space," and "incision." These labels are ancient because, like the words "appearance" and "difference," they have been used to refer to the lower place in hierarchies for centuries in Western thought. However, they are currently being used to refer to a resource that has never been given a name in "metaphysics," a resource that is truly "older" than the metaphysical judgment.

Deconstruction was started by Jacques Derrida in response to Heidegger's view of the "destruction" of the legacy of philosophy. Instead of referring to Heidegger's "destruction" as referring to "a process of analyzing the categories, concepts, and history behind which tradition imposes a word," Derrida sought to apply deconstruction in textual reading. In Derrida's opinion, deconstruction is not a philosophy, a theory, a method or a discipline, "what happens when it happens".

Deconstruction is more than just the demolition of an architectural structure; It is also a question of the foundation, the relationship between the foundation and the established; It is also a question of the closure of a holistic philosophical architecture.

Simply put, deconstruction can be seen as a way of understanding the relationship between text and meaning, between institution and nature, between dualities, and the established ranges of language. It is a kind of literary and philosophical analysis based on the writings of the post-structuralist philosopher Jacques Derrida. The emphasis of his work is on the fact that meaning does not exist according to time and place, but expands and changes. Rereading a

novel over a 20-year period and understanding how it each makes a different sense each time is an example of deconstruction.

Deconstruction is usually given by scrutiny of a particular text. It aims to expose and then subvert multiple binary objections that underlie our dominant way of thinking, such as presence/ absence, speech / writing, and so on.

Conclusion

Because the speaking subject' must speak the language of reason when he or she talks, Derrida's deconstruction remains a severe type of questioning. The main method of deconstruction here is to establish a binary opposition and illustrate how each phrase is truly a component of it, rather than being the polar opposite of its matched term. The structure or antagonism that had held them apart then crumbled. Finally, it is impossible to identify which is which, and the concept of binary opposition loses its significance or is transformed into a play. Because it combines constructing meaning and deconstructing the metaphysics of presence from the text, this method is dubbed "deconstruction." The notion is that you don't just make a new system of binaries and put the previously subordinated word on top of it, nor do you demolish the old system.

MODULE III

POWER AND SOCIETY

3.1   C Wright Mills: Power and Power Elite

3.2   Foucault: Archeology of Knowledge, Discourse Analysis, Discipline and Punish, History of Sexuality

3.3   Manuel Castells: Power of Identity

Power always entails a social relationship between at least two actors. It cannot be an attribute of one person. To say that an individual has power is meaningless unless it is stated over whom this power is exercised. An individual or group of individuals who hold power is / are able to get others to do what they want them to do. If those on whom the power is exercised resist or refuse to obey those who are powerful, they are punished in one way or the other. Power always gives rise to asymmetry in relationships.

Those who have greater access to limited resources e.g., control over finances, ownership or control over means of production and / or means of distribution are more powerful than those who do not have the means or the opportunity to control such resources. The use of sanction in imposing one's will is an important constituent of power and it is on this count that power differs from influence.

3.1 C Wright Mills: Power and Power Elite

C. Wright Mills, well known American sociologist who applied and popularized Max Weber's theories in the United States. Mills received his A.B. and A.M. from the University of Texas in 1939 and his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1941; he joined the sociology faculty

at Columbia University in 1946. At Columbia, Mills promoted the idea that social scientists should not merely be disinterested observers engaged in research and theory but assert their social responsibility. He was concerned about the ethics of his sociological peers, feeling that they often failed to affirm moral leadership and thus surrendered their social responsibility and allowed special interests, or people lacking qualifications, to assume positions of leadership.

He was born in Waco, Texas, in 1916. He completed his undergraduate education at the University of Texas, Austin, and received his PhD from the University of Wisconsin. He was subsequently professor of sociology at Columbia University. As well as writing many influential books and articles, Mills also edited and translated several of Weber's essays in *From Max Weber* (with H.H. Gerth). Mills died in 1962,   at age 46.

In 1939, Mills began graduate work in sociology at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he established a productive collaboration with the brilliant e´migre´ German sociologist, Hans H. Gerth. Together, they produced the edited volume *(*1946), which is perhaps the most influential single volume of Weber's work rendered in English, as well as the coauthored Character and Social Structure (1953), a work in social psychology.

Mills received his doctorate in sociology in 1942 on the strength of a dissertation that advanced a sociological account of American pragmatist philosophy via study of its leading originators, namely, Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey. Originally ''A Sociological Account of Pragmatism: An Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge,'' Mill's first book length study was published posthumously as Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America (1964), a title that captures the Alpha and Omega of Mills's sociology – European

sociology and American philosophy – as well as suggests how the confluence of Weberian sociology and Deweyian pragmatism in his own intellectual origins facilitated his development as a latter day Thorstein Veblen.

Mills's work drew heavily from Weber's differentiation between the various impacts of class, status, and power in explaining stratification systems and politics. His analysis of the major echelons of American society appeared in *The New Men of Power, America's Labor Leaders* (1948), *White Collar* (1951), and his best-known work, *The Power Elite* (1956). In this last book, Mills located the "elite," or ruling class, among those business, government, and military leaders whose decisions and actions have significant consequences.

Mills' research work is a veritable microcosm of American sociology's peculiar character, having written three of the most famous and discussed volumes in the field: White Collar (1954), The Power Elite (1956), and The Sociological Imagination (1959). Mills' political writings, likewise, remain partisan touchstones for social critics and citizens coping with the destructive consequences of the postmodern society, which Mills was among the first to see but did not live to truly understand.

In *The Power Elite*, Mills critically studied the concentration of power in mid-century America. Mills came to think of this book as the last in an emergent ''trilogy'' on the subject of power in advanced industrial society. *The New Men of Power* is thus construed as volume one, in which Mills analyzed the increasingly anti communist and, for the most part, anti socialist leadership of the newly legitimate American industrial unions. By virtue of their unions' strategic position in the US economy and their own command over substantial political mobilization, post war labor leaders wielded power sufficient, if used wisely, to

expand the scope of democratic freedom within the sanctum sanctorum of western modernity.

Volume two is *White Collar*, Mills's searing portrait of the new middle classes, the armies of pencil pushing managerial, technical, clerical, and sales functionaries who worked for the proverbial gray flannel suits, and who strode toward an abundant if also ticky tacky suburban version of the American Dream. In both these works, the structural antecedent to the power of labor leaders and various and sundry managers, technicians, and professionals is the advent of what Weber called legal rational or, simply, bureaucratic social organization.

The Power Elite is consistent in its attention to the analysis of the command positions at the apex of post war US military, capitalist, and state bureaucracies. Mills also analyzes expansion of mass society, which mirrors the bureaucratization of everyday life. Only upon the basis of an analysis of this type and scope does Mills then analyze the nearly interchangeable types of men (and they were all men) who, by virtue of their position in society, were called upon to fill these increasingly integrated positions of national and global power.

3.2 Foucault: Archeology of Knowledge, Discourse Analysis, Discipline and Punish,

History of Sexuality

Michel Foucault (1926–1984) was a French historian and philosopher, associated with the structuralist and post-structuralist movements. He has had strong influence not only in philosophy but also in a wide range of humanistic and social scientific disciplines. He was one of the most influential and controversial scholars of the post-World War II period.

Foucault was born in Poitiers, France, on October 15, 1926. As a student he was brilliant but psychologically tormented. He became academically established during the 1960s, holding a series of positions at French universities, before his election in 1969 to the ultra-prestigious Collège de France, where he was Professor of the History of Systems of Thought until his death. From the 1970s on, Foucault was very active politically. He was a founder of the *Groupe d'information sur les prisons* and often protested on behalf of marginalized groups. He frequently lectured outside France, particularly in the United States, and in 1983 had agreed to teach annually at the University of California at Berkeley. An early victim of AIDS, Foucault died in Paris on June 25, 1984. In addition to works published during his lifetime, his lectures at the Collège de France, published posthumously, contain important elucidations and extensions of his ideas.

His academic formation was in psychology and its history as well as in philosophy, his books were mostly histories of medical and social sciences, his passions were literary and political. Nonetheless, almost all of Foucault's works can be fruitfully read as philosophical in either or both of two ways: as carrying out philosophy's traditional critical project in a new (historical) manner; and as a critical engagement with the thought of traditional philosophers.

After graduating in 1952, Foucault began a career marked by constant movement, both professional and intellectual. He first taught at the University of Lille, then spent five years (1955–60) as a cultural attaché in Uppsala, Sweden; Warsaw, Poland; and Hamburg, West Germany (now Germany). Foucault defended his doctoral dissertation at the ENS in 1961. Circulated under the title "Madness and Unreason: A History of Madness in the Classical Age", it won critical praise but a limited audience.

His other early monographs, written while he taught at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in France (1960–66), had much the same fate. Not until the appearance of The Order of Things in 1966 did Foucault begin to attract wide notice as one of the most original and controversial thinkers of his day. He chose to watch his reputation grow from a distance- at the University of Tunis in Tunisia (1966–68)- and was still in Tunis when student riots erupted in Paris in the spring of 1968. In 1969 he published *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

In 1970, after a brief tenure as director of the philosophy department at the University of Paris, Vincennes, he was awarded a chair in the history of systems of thought at the Collège de France, France's most prestigious postsecondary institution. The appointment gave Foucault the opportunity to conduct intensive research.

Between 1971 and 1984 Foucault wrote several works, including Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975), a monograph on the emergence of the modern prison; three volumes of a history of Western sexuality; and numerous essays. Foucault continued to travel widely, and as his reputation grew he spent extended periods in Brazil, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the United States. He became particularly attached to Berkeley, California, and the San Francisco Bay area and was a visiting lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley for several years. Foucault died of a septicemia typical of AIDS in 1984, the fourth volume of his history of sexuality still incomplete.

As we discussed, the understanding and analysis of power has been critical to sociological thought. One of the prominent delineations of power has been provided by Foucault. His works analyse the link between power and knowledge. Foucault began his intellectual pursuits in philosophy but became disillusioned by its abstractions and

"naive truth claims" and turned to psychology and psychopathology. This resulted in his early writings, 'Madness and Civilization', 'The Birth of Clinic' and initiated his lifelong interest in the relationship between power and knowledge.

Foucault never attempts at any definition of power but gives a definition of power relations at best. "The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individuals or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called power with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist."

Foucault goes on to insist that knowledge and power are always and necessarily interdependent. A site where power is enforced is also a site where knowledge is produced and conversely, a site from which knowledge is derived is a place where power is exercised. In 'Discipline and Punish' he sees prison as an example of just such a site of power, and as a place where knowledge, essential to the modern social sciences, was formed. Reciprocally the ideas from which the social sciences were formulated were also the ones that gave birth to the prison. The belief that a scientist can arrive at an objective conclusion, Foucault argues, is one of the greatest fallacies of the modern, humanist era.

"Modern humanism is therefore mistaken in drawing this line between knowledge and Power. Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time where knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just a way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge. It is impossible for knowledge not to endanger power."

So instead of referring to power and knowledge separately, he prefers to compound the term power/knowledge**.**

Archaeology of Knowledge

Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, (1969) tries to consolidate the method of archaeology: it is the only one of Foucault's major works that does not comprise an historical study, and thus his most theoretical work. It is the most influential work of Foucault's in literary criticism and some other applied areas.

Archaeology, Foucault now declares, means approaching language in a way that does not refer to a subject who transcends it – though he acknowledges he has not been rigorous enough in this respect in the past. That is not to say that Foucault is making a strong metaphysical claim about subjectivity, but rather only that he is proposing a mode of analysis that subordinates the role of the subject. Foucault in fact proposes to suspend acceptance not only of the notion of a subject who produces discourse but of all generally accepted discursive unities, such as the book.

Instead, he wants to look only at the surface level of what is said, rather than to try to interpret language in terms of what stands behind it, be that hidden meaning, structures, or subjects. Foucault's suggestion is to look at language in terms of discrete linguistic events, which he calls "statements," such as to understand the multitudinous ways in which statements relate to one another. Foucault's statement is not defined by content (a statement is not a proposition), nor by its simple materiality (the sounds made, the marks on paper). The specificity of a statement is rather determined both by such intrinsic properties and by its extrinsic relations, by context as well as content.

Foucault asserts the autonomy of discourse, that language has a power that cannot be reduced to other things, either to the will of a speaking subject, or to economic and social forces, for example. This is not to say that statements exist independently of extra-linguistic reality, however, or of larger "discursive formations" in which they occur. It is rather the opposite. Both these things in effect need to be factored into analyses of statements – the identity of the statement is conditioned both by its relation to other statements, to discourse as such, and to reality, as well as by its intrinsic form. The statement is governed by a "system of its functioning," which Foucault calls the "archive." Archaeology is now interpreted as the excavation of the archive. This of course retroactively includes much of what Foucault has been doing all along.

Foucault followed this work with his celebrated 1969 essay, "What is an Author?" (somewhat confusingly because many versions of this circulate, including multiple translations of the original, and Foucault's own translation, was delivered in English many years later), which effectively concludes the series of Foucault's writings on literature in the 1960s. This work represents an extension in literary theory of the impulse behind the *Archaeology*, with Foucault systematically criticizing the notion of an author, and suggesting that we can move beyond ascribing transcendent sovereignty to the subject in our understanding of discourse, understanding the subject rather as a function of discourse.

Discourse Analysis

The idea of discourse constitutes a central element of Michel Foucault's *work*, and one of the most readily appropriated Foucaultian terms, such that 'Foucaultian discourse analysis' now constitutes an academic field in its own right. This post therefore sets out to describe Foucault's

notion of discourse, and to define in broad terms the task of Foucaultian discourse analysis.

Foucault adopted the term 'discourse' to denote a historically contingent social system that produces knowledge and meaning. He notes that discourse is distinctly material in effect, producing what he calls 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak'. Discourse is, thus, a way of organising knowledge that structures the constitution of social (and progressively global) relations through the collective understanding of the discursive logic and the acceptance of the discourse as social fact.

For Foucault, the logic produced by a discourse is structurally related to the broader episteme (structure of knowledge) of the historical period in which it arises. However, discourses are produced by effects of power within a social order, and this power prescribes particular rules and categories which define the criteria for legitimating knowledge and truth within the discursive order. These rules and categories are considered *a priori*; that is, coming *before* the discourse. It is in this way that discourse masks its construction and capacity to produce knowledge and meaning. It is also in this way that discourse claims an irrefutable a–historicity.

Further, through its reiteration in society, the rules of discourse fix the meaning of statements or text to be conducive to the political rationality that underlies its production. Yet at the same time, the discourse hides both its capacity to fix meaning and its political intentions. It is as such that a discourse can mask itself as a-historical, universal, and scientific – that is, objective and stable. Accordingly, Stephen Gill describes Foucault's concept of discourse as 'a set of ideas and practices with particular conditions of existence, which are more or less

institutionalised, but which may only be partially understood by those that they encompass.'

As a discourse fixes text with a specific meaning, it disqualifies other meanings and interpretations. Foucault speaks of this discursive process as reducing the contingencies (the other meanings) of text, in order to eliminate the differences which could challenge or destabilise the meaning and power of the discourse:

In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.

One of the ways in which this is achieved is through the commentaries of discourse: the statements or texts which continually reaffirm the meanings enacted by the discourse, without ever breaching the discursive paradigm. Foucault explains thus:

Commentary averts the chance element of discourse by giving it its due: it gives us the opportunity to say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered [re-iterated] and, in some ways, finalised. The open multiplicity, the fortuitousness, is transferred, by the principle of commentary, from what is liable to be said to the number, the form, the masks and the circumstances of repetition. The novelty lies no longer in what is said, but in its reappearance.

Through this reiterative process discourse normalises and homogenises, including upon the bodies and subjectivities of those it dominates, as Foucault explores in *Discipline and Punish* 91975), and in some of his later lecture series. By fixing the meaning of text, and by pre-determining the categories of reason by which statements are

accepted as knowledge, a discourse creates an epistemic reality and becomes a technique of control and discipline. That which does not conform to the enunciated truth of discourse is rendered deviant, that is, outside of discourse, and outside of society, sociality or the 'sociable'. With effect, Foucault demonstrated these discursive practices of exclusion in the categories of reason and madness in his first major work, *Madness and Civilization*.

However, it is in one of his last published works that we find a compelling description of the function of discourse analysis as a technique of critique and problematisation: *The Will to Knowledge: History of Sexuality Volume I*. With respect to sexuality and the discourse which produces its historical meaning, Foucault writes:

> *Why has sexuality been so widely discussed, and what has been said about it? What were the effects of power generated by what was said? […] The central issue, then, is […] to account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said. What is at issue, briefly, is the over–all 'discursive fact', the way in which sex is 'put into discourse'.*

What Foucault sets out in broad terms is the task of discourse analysis, for it must 'account for the fact that [the discourse in question] is spoken about', and analyse the effects of power that are produced by what is said. Moreover discourse analysis must seek to unfix and destabilise the accepted meanings, and to reveal the ways in which dominant discourses excludes, marginalises and oppresses realities that constitute, at least, equally valid claims to the question of how power could and should be exercised.

Discipline and Punish

In the early 1970s, Foucault's involvement with the prisoners' movement led him to lecture two years running on prisons at the Collège de France, which led to his work in 1975: *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* The subtitle here references *The Birth of the Clinic*, indicating some continuity of project; both titles in turn of course reference Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*.

Discipline and Punish is a book about the emergence of the prison system. The conclusion of the book in relation to this subject matter is that the prison is an institution, the objective purpose of which is to produce criminality and recidivism. The system encompasses the movement that calls for reform of the prisons as an integral and permanent part. This thesis is somewhat obscured by a particular figure from the book that has garnered much more attention, namely Jeremy Bentham's "panopticon," a design for a prison in which every prisoner's every action was visible, which greatly influenced nineteenth century penal architecture, and indeed institutional architecture more generally, up to the level of city planning. Though Foucault is often presented as a theorist of "panopticism," this is not the central claim of the book.

The more important general theme of the book is that of "discipline" in the penal sense, a specific historical form of power that was taken up by the state with professional soldiering in the 17th century, and spread widely across society, first via the panoptic prison, then via the division of labor in the factory and universal education. The purpose of discipline is to produce "docile bodies," the individual movements of which can be controlled, and which in its turn involves the psychological monitoring and control of individuals, indeed which for Foucault produces individuals as such.

History of Sexuality

Foucault's history of sexuality was originally projected as a fairly straightforward extension of the genealogical approach of *Discipline and Punish* to the topic of sexuality. Foucault's idea is that the various modern fields of knowledge about sexuality (various "sciences of sexuality", including psychoanalysis) have an intimate association with the power structures of modern society and so are prime candidates for genealogical analysis. The first volume of this project, published in 1976, was intended as the introduction to a series of studies on particular aspects of modern sexuality (children, women, "perverts", population, etc.). It outlined the project of the overall history, explaining the basic viewpoint and the methods to be used.

On Foucault's account, modern control of sexuality parallels modern control of criminality by making sex (like crime) an object of allegedly scientific disciplines, which simultaneously offer knowledge and domination of their objects. However, it becomes apparent that there is a further dimension in the power associated with the sciences of sexuality. Not only is there control exercised via other people's knowledge of individuals such as doctors' knowledge, for example; there is also control via individuals' knowledge of themselves. Individuals internalize the norms laid down by the sciences of sexuality and monitor themselves in an effort to conform to these norms. Thus, they are controlled not only as *objects* of disciplines but also as self-scrutinizing and self-forming *subjects*.

Foucault shows how sexuality becomes an essential construct in determining not only moral worth, but also health, desire, and identity. Subjects are further obligated to tell the truth about themselves by confessing the details of their sexuality. Foucault argued that modern sexuality was

characterized by the secularization of religious techniques of confession: one no longer confesses the details of one's sexual desire to a priest; one goes to a doctor, a therapist, a psychologist, or a psychiatrist.

The book begins with a repudiation of the "repressive hypothesis", the idea that sexuality in the Victorian era was repressed and discourse on it silenced. Foucault claims that it was not repression that characterized the primary attitude of modern society towards sex; rather, sexuality became the object of new kinds of discourse—medical, juridical and psychological – and that discourse on it actually increased. Sexuality was inextricably linked to truth: these new discourses were able to tell us the scientific truth about ourselves through our sexuality.

Although the book is a historical study of the emergence of modern sexuality in the nineteenth century, Foucault's targets were also contemporary ideas and practices. The prevalent views on sexuality in the 1960s and 1970s held that there was a natural and healthy sexuality that all human beings shared simply in virtue of being human, and this sexuality was presently repressed by cultural prohibitions and conventions such as bourgeois morality and capitalist socio-economic structures. Repressed sexuality was the cause of various neuroses and it was important to have an active and free sexuality. The popular discourse on sexuality thus fervently argued for sexual liberation: we had to liberate our true sexuality from the repressive mechanisms of power.

Foucault challenged this view by showing how our conceptions and experiences of sexuality are in fact always the result of specific cultural conventions and mechanisms of power and could not exist independently of them. The mission to liberate our repressed sexuality was thus fundamentally misguided because there was no authentic or

natural sexuality to liberate. To free oneself from one set of norms only meant adopting different norms in their stead, and that could turn out to be just as controlling and normalizing. He wrote mockingly that the irony of our endless preoccupation with sexuality was that we believed that it had something to do with our liberation.

In order to challenge the dominant view of the relationship between sexuality and repressive power, Foucault had to re-conceive the nature of power. His major claim is that power is not essentially repressive but productive. It does not operate by repressing and prohibiting the true and authentic expressions of a natural sexuality. Instead it produces, through cultural normative practices and scientific discourses, the ways in which we experience and conceive of our sexuality. Power relations are "the internal conditions" of our sexual identities.

Foucault outlined what became one of the most influential contemporary understandings of power in a series of short propositions over three pages of *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*. He elucidated and developed this understanding of power in a number of essays, lectures and interviews throughout the rest of his life, but the basic idea was already present in these pages. We should not try to look for the center of power, or for the individuals, institutions or classes that rule, but should rather construct a "microphysics of power" that focuses on the multitude of loci of power spread throughout a society: families, workplaces, everyday practices, and marginal institutions. One has to analyze power relations from the bottom up and not from the top down, and to study the myriad ways in which the subjects themselves are constituted in these diverse but intersecting networks.

Although dispersed among various interlacing networks throughout society, power nevertheless has a

rationality, a series of aims and objectives, and the means of attaining them. This does not imply that any individual has consciously formulated them. As the example of the Panopticon shows, power often functions according to a clear rationality irrespective of the intentions and motives of the individual who guards the prison from the tower. Despite the centrality of the Panopticon as a model for power, Foucault does not hold that power forms a deterministic system of overbearing constraints. Power should rather be understood and analyzed as an unstable network of practices implying that where there is power, there is always resistance too. Just as there is no center of power, there is no center of resistance somewhere outside of it. Resistance is rather inherent in power relations and their dynamics, it is "the odd term in the relations of power" (1976 [1978: 96]). While power relations permeate the whole body of society, they may be denser in some regions and less dense in others.

Foucault's short but influential discussion of biopower also first appears at the end of *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. Foucault contrasts it to what he calls sovereign power: a form of power that was historically founded on violence—the right to kill. It was exercised mainly by "deduction" (taking something away): it consisted of the right to appropriate a portion of the nation's wealth, for example by imposing a tax on products, goods and services, or by demanding a portion of the subjects' time, strength, and ultimately life itself. The obligation to wage war on behalf of the sovereign and the imposition of death penalty for going against his will were the clearest forms of such power. But Foucault claims that the West has undergone a profound transformation in its mechanisms of power since the seventeenth century. Deductive and violent sovereign power has been gradually complemented and partly replaced by biopower, a form of power that exerts a positive influence on life, "that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it,

subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations" (1976 [1978: 137]). This era of biopower is marked by the explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the control of populations: techniques that, for example, coordinate medical care, normalize behavior, rationalize mechanisms of insurance, and rethink urban planning. The aim is the effective administration of bodies and the calculated management of life through means that are scientific and continuous. Mechanisms of power and knowledge have assumed responsibility for the life process in order to optimize, control, and modify it. The exercise of power over living beings no longer carries the threat of death, but instead takes charge of their lives.

The rationality of biopower is markedly different from that of sovereign power in terms not just of its objectives, but also of its instruments. A major consequence of its development is the growing importance of norms at the expense of the juridical system of the law. Foucault claims that the dominance of biopower as the paradigmatic form of power means that we live in a society in which the power of the law has subsided in favor of regulative and corrective mechanisms based on scientific knowledge. Biopower penetrates traditional forms of political power, but it is essentially the power of experts and administrators.

The genealogical attempt to historicize the body is prominent also in *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, but now Foucault's target is the naturalist explanations of sex and sexuality. At the end of the book Foucault takes up the question of whether we can find a scientific truth about sex. He makes clear that his genealogical investigation of sexuality implies a challenge to a certain kind of explanatory framework of sexuality and gender: the idea of sex as a natural foundation or an unobserved cause, which supports the visible effects of gender and sexuality.

He critically appraises the idea of a natural, scientifically defined true sex by revealing the historical development of this form of thought. He does not claim that sex, understood as the categories of maleness and femaleness, was invented in a particular historical period. He rather analyses the ways in which these categories were founded and explained in discourses claiming the status of scientific truth, and how this allegedly "pure" explanation in fact constituted these categories so that they were understood as "natural". This idea has had enormous influence on feminist philosophers and queer theorists. Judith Butler has appropriated this idea in her influential book *Gender Trouble* to argue that allegedly scientific ideas of sex as a natural and necessary ground for sexual and gendered identities in fact have a normative function: they constitute our conceptions of "normal" men and women and their "natural" sexual desire for each other.

3.3 Manuel Castells: Power of Identity

Manuel Castells was born in Barcelona, Spain, in 1942. He received his PhD in sociology from the University of Paris, where he was subsequently a professor. He spent most of his career as professor of sociology and city and regional planning at the University of California, Berkeley, and in 2003, accepted a distinguished chair at the University of Southern California. Castells is widely recognized for his academic and policy expertise on the information society, and has received numerous international awards. He continues to lecture widely and to write on the challenges posed by the network society.

One recent contribution to modern social theory is a trilogy authored by Manuel Castells (1996, 1997, 1998; Allan, 2007) with the overarching title *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture.* Castells (1996:4) articulates a position opposed to postmodern social theory, which he

sees as indulging in "celebrating the end of history, and, to some extent, the end of Reason, giving up on our capacity to understand and make sense".

Castells examines the emergence of a new society, culture, and economy in light of the revolution, begun in the United States in the 1970s, in informational technology (television, computers, and so on). This revolution led, in turn, to a fundamental restructuring of the capitalist system beginning in the 1980s and to the emergence of what Castells calls "informational capitalism." Also emerging were "informational societies" (although there are important cultural and institutional differences among these societies).

Both are based on "informationalism" ("a mode of development in which the main source of productivity is the qualitative capacity to optimize the combination and use of factors of production on the basis of knowledge and information" (Castells, 1998:7). The spread of informationalism, especially informational capitalism, leads to the emergence of oppositional social movements based on self and identity ("the process by which a social actor recognizes itself and constructs meaning primarily on the basis of a given cultural attribute or set of attributes, to the exclusion of a broader reference to other social structures" [Castells, 1996:22]).

Such movements bring about the contemporary equivalent of what Marxists call "class struggle." The hope against the spread of informational capitalism and the problems it causes (exploitation, exclusion, threats to self and identity) is not the working class but a diverse set of social movements (e.g., ecological, feminist) based primarily on identity.

At the heart of Castells's analysis is what he calls the information technology paradigm with five basic characteristics.

- First, these are technologies that act on information.

- Second, since information is part of all human activity, these technologies have a pervasive effect.

- Third, all systems using information technologies are defined by a "networking logic" that allows them to affect a wide variety of processes and organizations.

- Fourth, the new technologies are highly flexible, allowing them to adapt and change constantly.

- Finally, the specific technologies associated with information are merging into a highly integrated system.

In the 1980s there emerged a new, increasingly profitable global informational economy. "It is *informational* because the productivity and competitiveness of units or agents in this economy (be it firms, regions, or nations) fundamentally depend upon their capacity to generate, process, and apply efficiently knowledge-based information" (Castells, 1996:66). It is global because it has the "capacity *to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale* " (Castells, 1996:92). This was made possible, for the first time, by the new information and communication technologies. And it is "informational, not just information-based, because the cultural-institutional attributes of the whole social system must be included in the diffusion and implementation of the new technological paradigm" (Castells, 1996:91).

Although it is global, there are differences, and Castells distinguishes among regions that lie at the heart of the new global economy (North America, the European Union, and the Asian Pacific). Thus, we are talking about a regionalized, global economy. In addition, there is considerable diversity within each region, and of crucial importance is the fact that while some areas of the globe are

included, others are excluded and suffer grave negative consequences.

Whole areas of the world (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa) are excluded, as are parts of the privileged regions, such as the inner cities in the United States. Accompanying the rise of the new global informational economy is the emergence of a new organizational form, the network enterprise. Among other things, the network enterprise is characterized by flexible (rather than mass) production, new management systems (frequently adapted from Japanese models), organizations based on a horizontal rather than a vertical model, and the intertwining of large corporations in strategic alliances.

However, most important, the fundamental component of organizations is a series of networks. It is this that leads Castells (1996:171) to argue that "a new organizational form has emerged as characteristic of the informational/global economy: the *network enterprise*" defined as *"that specific form of enterprise whose system of means is constituted by the intersection of segments of autonomous systems of goals."* The network enterprise is the materialization of the culture of the global informational economy, and it makes possible the transformation of signals into commodities through the processing of knowledge.

As a result, the nature of work is being transformed (e.g., the individualization of work through such things as flex-time), although the precise nature of this transformation varies from one nation to another. Castells (1996:373) also discusses the emergence (accompanying the development of multimedia out of the fusion of the mass media and computers) of the culture of *real virtuality, "a system in which reality itself (that is, people's material/symbolic existence) is entirely captured, fully immersed in a virtual image setting, in the world of make-believe, in which*

appearances are not just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but they become the experience".

In contrast to the past dominated by "the space of places" (e.g., cities like New York or London), a new spatial logic, the "space of flows," has emerged. We have become a world dominated by processes rather than physical locations (although the latter obviously continue to exist). Similarly, we have entered an era of "timeless time" in which, for example, information is instantly available anywhere on the globe. Going beyond the network enterprise, Castells (1996:469, 470; italics added) argues that the "dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around *networks"* defined as sets of "interconnected nodes." Networks are open, capable of unlimited expansion, dynamic, and able to innovate without disrupting the system.

However, the fact that our age is defined by networks (the "network society") does not mean the end of capitalism. In fact, at least at the moment, networks allow capitalism to become, for the first time, truly global and organized on the basis of global financial flows, exemplified by the much-discussed global "financial casino" that is a wonderful example of not only a network but also an informational system. Money won and lost here is now far more important than that earned through the production process. Money has come to be separated from production; we are in a capitalist age defined by the endless search for money.

MODULE IV

LATE MODERNITY

4.1.   George Ritzer: McDonaldisation

4.2.   Fredric Jameson: Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism

4.3.   Daniel Bell- Post Industrial Societies

Introduction

Late modernity is a term used by writers who do not believe there has been a transition to a new societal stage of post-modernity, but who do believe that some of the tendencies of modernity have been dramatically intensified. The works of Anthony Giddens, Frederic Jameson, David Harvey, and Jürgen Habermas are most prominently connected with the overall perspective. Rather than emphasizing cultural fragmentation and centrifugal tendencies, these theorists highlight the sharpening and extension of a range of institutional traits that are thought to underpin these cultural changes. They also stress the importance of centripetal, ordering, forces as well as the possibility of emancipatory politics.

The fluidities, disjunctions, simulations, and forms of nihilism that post-modernism detects and promotes in the cultural sphere, according to Harvey and Jameson, are the result of deeper structural changes brought about by late capitalism's post-industrial, globally networked period, the era of post-fordism. Similarly, Giddens emphasises global capitalism's intensification and reconfiguration, but in connection with simultaneous changes in surveillance and administrative control, the nation-state system, and the world military order. Both Giddens and Harvey emphasise the importance of time and space in their analyses. In terms of

communication, identification, and activity coordination, the world has shrunk dramatically as a result of information, media, and transportation technology.

Giddens uses Ulrich Beck's concept of 'reflexive modernization' to highlight the double-bind in which, in an age of increased complexity, diverse perspectives, and unprecedented access to knowledge about the conditions of activity, such information is inevitably and chronically used to reorder and redefine that activity, despite the knowledge that the effects will often be perverse.

Giddens, drawing heavily from the thoughts of Marx among others, does so in a critical way, emphasizing the multi-dimensional nature of modernity, its complex causal patterns and institutional logics and the inherently contingent qualities of political and social change. In Giddens' view, modernity has multi-dimensions. It has four main institutional aspects:

1. Capitalism (the system of production of commodities for markets, in which wage labour is also a commodity);

2. Industrialism (the application of inanimate sources of power through productive techniques for the transformation of nature),

3. Coordinated administrative power focused through surveillance (the control of information and the monitoring of the activities of subject populations by states and other organizations); and

4. Military power (the concentration of the means of violence in the hands of the state).

These four institutional dimensions of modernity are irreducible to one another, because the form and logic of each one are quite different from those of the others. The

development and dynamics of military power and warfare, for example, affected the shape and structure of capitalist development as well as particular patterns of class and class conflict, and helped generate an alternative power system of nation-states.

In Giddens' judgement, each of the four institutional dimensions consists of a distinctive set of causal processes and structure. Taken together, however, they provide a framework for understanding some of the central features, developments and tensions in modern societies. His first three books were on Weber, Durkheim and the major 19th century theorists including Marx. His best known theoretical contribution is on structuration. Structuration means to produce structure. Besides structuration, Giddens' second major concern is what he calls later modernity. This has been his major interest since the beginning of 1990s.

By modernity, Giddens refers to the institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in poet-feudal Europe, but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact. Modernity can be understood as roughly equivalent to the industrialized world, so long as it be recognized that industrialism is not its only institutional dimension.

Kivisto (1998) has interpreted Giddens' definition of modernity and says that Giddens speaks of "late modern society, not postmodern or post-industrial society. By this means he emphasizes historical continuity and change, rather than disjuncture". In fact, capitalism is a highly competitive system of production with labour markets operating on a global scale.

And, industrialism which refers to the use of machine technology to control and transform nature. Besides industry, the most recognizable feature of this late modern world is the nation-State.

In addition, Giddens also refers to the importance of communication in tying the modern world together. The nation-state provides the opportunity for democracy, for individual agency within a complex world with such a framework of theory modernity bids farewell to gods and tradition and tries to attain a modern world for reflexive self-regulations. It means that by self-regulation we can make out our own history.

Giddens has described the modern world as a juggernaut. It is the advanced stage of modernity. Because of its advanced stage, he calls it late modernity also. Modernity is like a powerful machine. If it is not controlled meaningfully, it can be highly harmful to society. But, if taken up cautiously, it can be beneficial also.

Here is the way Giddens describes the juggernaut of modernity: Juggernaut is a runaway engine of enormous power which collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of control and which could tend itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee.

The ride is not always unpleasant or unrewarding: it can often be exhilarating and charged with hopeful anticipation. But, so long as the institutions of modernity endure, we shall never be able to control completely either the path or the pace of the journey. In turn, we shall never be able to feel entirely secure, because the terrain across which it runs is fraught with risks of high consequences.

Modernity does not provide a Cakewalk to society. If it is highly beneficial for the people, it is equally dangerous. It requires proper handling. And, it is here that Giddens' theory of structuration fits well. If the actions of the individual are not rational, modernity could lead one to doom

and holocaust. Multi-dimensions of modernity, Modernity consists of four basic institutions:

➤ Capitalism,

➤ Industrialism,

➤ Administrative power, and

➤ Military power.

Capitalism includes commodity production, private ownership of capital, property less wage labour and a class system derived from these characteristics. Industrialism involves the case of power sources and machinery to produce goods. These two characteristics of modernity given by Giddens are not new. However, the latter two characteristics are special to Giddens. Administrative power gives state to supervise the activities of the subject populations. It is power of surveillance. It is to keep close watch on the activities of the citizens. The final institution of modernity is the military power. The nation-state controls the means of violence. The four institutions of modernity which constitute the theory of Giddens are presented in a tabular form as under:

Institutional Complexes of Modernity

Institution of Modernity	Types of Functions	Objectives of Modern Society
Capitalism	Production, private ownership, wage labour, class system	Socialized economic organization
Industrialism	Use of power sources, science, technology	System of planetary care
Administrative power	Surveillance capacity	Co-ordinated global order
Military power	Peace	Transcendence of war

Giddens lists four risks that are specific to the late modern world. These are:

▪ State surveillance,

▪ Escalation of military power,

▪ Collapse of economic growth, and

- The ecological and environmental limits that constrain capitalism.

We can summarize the Giddens' theory of modernity in the words of Adams and Sydie (2001) as under the modern world involves both human agency and constraint, which together are close to the definition of structuralism. That world includes distanciation, power, trust, risk, and the created self.

4.1 George Ritzer: McDonaldisation

George Ritzer's (2000) McDonaldization thesis, which argues that the giant fast food corporation is now the paradigm of culture and social relationships, governed by efficiency, calculability, predictability, and technological control. McDonaldization is the process by which principles of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more spheres of US society and the rest of the world.

Coined by the sociologist George Ritzer, the term invokes the famous fast food chain founded by Ray Kroc in 1955 as a metaphor for a widespread change in the delivery of goods and services toward more instrumentally efficient means of distribution. In a series of books and articles, Ritzer describes the competitive advantages of the McDonald's service system and catalogs the many ways in which it has shaped the expanding consumer marketplace.

The concept of ''McDonaldization'' building on the work of German sociologist Max Weber, Ritzer argues that the phenomenon of McDonald's fast food restaurants now embodies and retools the principles of industrial rationality: efficiency, calculability, prediction, and control ''particularly through the substitution of nonhuman for human technology.'' For Ritzer, the McDonaldization model has extended the ''iron cage'' of industrial society's rationalization process, moving beyond Weber's theory of

bureaucratization as well as other production models such as Fordism and Taylorism.

Moreover, Ritzer's model of McDonaldization suggests advancement in the rationality process by providing a template for social institutions and places of consumption such as hospitals, schools, and theme parks to emulate. For Ritzer, this new model of production accelerates the influence of instrumental reason by streamlining the production/consumption model, enabling the rationalization process to encroach into more sectors of society both within the US as well as the rest of the world.

McDonaldization can be understood as a specific instance of the process of rationalization: the development of instrumentally efficient means to achieve a given end. Weber first described the process of rationalization in reference to the development of administrative bureaucracies in modern Europe. Bureaucracies attain a high degree of efficiency by being organized into functionally differentiated, hierarchical systems based on written rules.

After World War II the same principles of efficiency began to be applied on a widespread basis to sectors outside the bureaucracy (and factory), most notably in the fast food restaurant and other spaces of consumption. Streamlining meant that newly minted consumers had more access to a greater variety of goods than ever before. It also meant that they could expect more consistency, lower costs, and in some cases a higher level of quality from their purchases.

The McDonald's service system can be thought of as a paradigm of contemporary rationalization. Ritzer derives five principles of McDonaldization from Weber's writings on rationalization. These are efficiency, calculability, predictability, control through the substitution of non human for human technology, and the irrationality of rationality. Efficiency refers to the optimal means for achieving a given

end. Efficiency is often achieved by the functional differentiation of tasks and the development of discrete routines that are engineered to save time and labor.

Calculability places an emphasis on the quantifiable aspects of a product or process. Calculability is achieved by an emphasis on the quantity of units sold, the speed at which units can be produced, the size of portions, or relatively low cost. Control is exerted to a high degree over workers in a McDonaldized system. Workers are trained to relate to customers using scripts, rather than their own words. They are also trained to prepare orders following scripted routines. Codified routines make it easy to train new employees and keep labor costs low. They have also contributed to a firm's ability to supply a standardized product over time and across many outlets. Predictability means that the settings, procedure, and production in a McDonaldized system are much the same from one time or place to another.

Control may be exercised through the substitution of non human for human technology, with workers being replaced by machines. Machines save both labor and time spent on production. Kroc himself sold five spindle milk shake mixers before he founded McDonald's. Automation is also used to prompt workers to perform their specified routines, typically using a system of timers and blinking lights to orchestrate when a particular procedure will be performed. Control may also be exercised over customers to save labor and time. The enlistment of customers as active participants, from the process of preparing their own beverages at the beginning of the dining experience through to the process of bussing their own tables at the end of it, contributes to the overall efficiency of the operation.

The irrationality of rationality refers to the negative consequences of McDonaldized systems. The crux of the matter might be termed the ''subjectivity of efficiency.''

Operators and their efficiency engineers weigh the costs and benefits of each step in the delivery process with an eye on profitability. As a result, irrationalities that do not affect the profits of affirm accrue. For example, McDonaldization has adverse effects on the environment because of the amount of disposable material it generates as a matter of course. It has had a negative effect on public health as the emphasis on quantity over quality has been identified as a contributor to a marked increase in obesity among Americans.

Ritzer has particularly pointed criticism of the alienation consumers experience in McDonaldized settings. He suggests that McDonaldized systems do a disservice to consumers by forcing them to submit to the dehumanizing controls of a rationalized environment. Operators are at pains to make their rational system more attractive settings for consumers by using themes and spectacles, but they remain a systematic threat to genuine human sociality and diminish the possibility of deriving meaning from consumer activities.

The principles of McDonaldization have diffused primarily in two ways: first, through the competitive expansion of the franchise (now 30,000 outlets worldwide); second, by the emulative actions of competitors. Simplified pro ducts, low labor costs, and no frills service are elements of a dominant paradigm that has spread to many sectors of the economy. Others have described the McDonaldization of noncommercial institutions, including higher education, the church, and the justice system.

Ritzer is critical of the homogenizing effects of McDonaldization on consumer culture. He worries that the success of McDonaldization has contributed to the decline of local and regional forms of consumer culture by subjecting less efficient forms of production and service delivery to intensive competition. The theory of McDonaldization has been subject to a variety of critiques. In a volume edited by

Barry Smart (1999) contributors question the effects of McDonaldization, asking whether customers are truly alienated by what they consume.

The moral objection of groups such as vegetarians is evidence of resistance to the paradigm of McDonaldization. They also question the scope of McDonaldization. It is suggested that McDonaldization is an issue only for a relatively wealthy fraction of the world's population. Finally, counter examples point to the limits of McDonaldization: for example, the diversity found in art markets suggests that streamlining is not incommensurate with creative and personal products.

The McDonaldization of Society (Ritzer 2004) is a model for how to produce socially relevant sociological theory. The concept of McDonaldization captures in an evocative way the pervasive effects of rationalization on consumption and beyond. It has contributed both to the debates over the consequences of consumerism and to the effects of globalization on cultural diversity.

4.2 Fredric Jameson: Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism

Fredric Jameson, in his magisterial work, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), has offered us a particularly influential analysis of our current postmodern condition. Fredric Jameson was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1934. He was educated at Haverford College, Pennsylvania, and Yale University, where he completed a doctorate in philosophy. He has written extensively on Marxism and postmodernism, and is currently professor of comparative literature and director of the Duke Center for Critical Theory at Duke University.

Fredrick Jameson trained in the tradition of Marxism and developed his own neo Marxist analysis of the postmodern era. Like Foucault and others working in Europe

in the 1960s, Jameson was very influenced by the anti war and New Left political movements. He integrates many disparate theories into his work, from Marxism to psychoanalysis, and from structuralism to poststructuralism. In his key text Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Jameson outlines the development of postmodernism in a vein similar to Marx's model of the stages of capitalist development.

According to Jameson, postmodernity has transformed the historical past into a series of emptied-out stylizations (what Jameson terms pastiche) that can then be commodified and consumed. The result is the threatened victory of capitalist thinking over all other forms of thought. Jameson contrasts this postmodern situation with the modernist situation that has been superceded. Whereas modernism still believed in "some residual zones of 'nature' or 'being,' of the old, the older, the archaic" and still believed that one could "do something to that nature and work at transforming that 'referent'", postmodernism has lost a sense of any distinction between the Real and Culture.

For Jameson, postmodernity amounts to "an immense dilation of [culture's] sphere (the sphere of commodities), an immense and historically original acculturation of the Real". Whereas "modernism was still minimally and tendentially the critique of the commodity and the effort to make it transcend itself," postmodernism "is the consumption of sheer commodification as a process". That apparent victory of commodification over all spheres of life marks postmodernity's reliance on the "cultural logic of late capitalism."

Following from this economic base for thinking about postmodernity, Jameson proceeds to pinpoint a number of symptoms that he associates with the postmodern condition:

1. The weakening of historicity. Jameson sees our "historical deafness" as one of the symptoms of our age, which includes "a series of spasmodic and intermittent, but desperate, attempts at recuperation. Postmodern theory itself Jameson sees as a desperate attempt to make sense of the age but in a way that refuses the traditional forms of understanding (narrative, history, the reality obscured by ideology).

   For postmodernists, there is no outside of ideology or textuality; indeed, postmodern theory questions any claim to "truth" outside of culture; Jameson sees this situation as itself a symptom of the age, which in turn plays right into the hands of capitalism: "postmodernism is not the cultural dominant of a wholly new social order..., but only the reflex and the concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism itself". Jameson calls instead for the return of history; hence, his mantra: "always historicize!" Jameson pinpoints a weakening of history "both in our relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private temporality, whose 'schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the more temporal arts".

- As Jameson explains, the schizophrenic suffers from a "breakdown of the signifying chain" in his/her use of language until "the schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time" (Postmodernism 27). Our loss of historicity, according to Jameson, most resembles such a schizophrenic position.

2. A breakdown of the distinction between "high" and "low" culture. As Jameson puts it, the various forms of postmodernism "have, in fact, been fascinated precisely

by this whole 'degraded' landscape of schlock and kitsch, of TV series and Reader's Digest culture, of advertising and motels, of the late show and the grade-B Hollywood film, of so-called Para literature, with its airport paperback categories of the gothic and the romance, the popular biography, the murder mystery, and the science fiction or fantasy novel: materials they no long simply 'quote,' as a Joyce or a Mahler might have done, but incorporate into their very substance" (Postmodernism 3).

3. "a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary 'theory' and in a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum" (Postmodernism 6). This depthlessness is, of course, supported by point # 5. The depthlessness manifests itself through literal flatness (two dimensional screens, flat skyscrapers full of reflecting windows) and qualitative superficiality. In theory, it manifests itself through the postmodern rejection of the belief that one can ever fully move beyond the surface appearances of ideology or "false consciousness" to some deeper truth; we are left instead with "multiple surfaces" (Postmodernism 12). One result is "that our daily life, our psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism" (Postmodernism 16).

4. "the waning of affect" (Postmodernism 10) and "a whole new type of emotional ground tone—what I will call 'intensities'—which can best be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime" (Postmodernism 6). The general depthlessness and affectlessness of postmodern culture is countered by outrageous claims for extreme moments of intense emotion, which

Jameson aligns with schizophrenia and a culture of (drug) addiction. With the loss of historicity, the present is experienced by the schizophrenic subject "with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious charge of affect" (Postmodernism 28), which can be "described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity" (Postmodernism 28-29).

5. a whole new technology (computers, digital culture, etc.), though Jameson insists on seeing such technology as "itself a figure for a whole new economic world system" (Postmodernism 6). Such technologies are more concerned with reproduction rather than with the industrial production of material goods

According to Jameson the postmodern era is neither a clean break from, nor a smooth continuation of, modernity. Jameson applies Marxist theory to late capitalism, an era not generally thought of in Marxist terms. He casts a wide net over the late twentieth century, touching on visual art, architecture, "high modernist" techniques, and trends in new media, showing how these expressive modes translate both capitalist and Marxist assumptions into material objects.

Within these genres, he focuses on techniques such as pastiche, the reduction of affect (emotional content), the flattening of fields and spaces, and recursivity (the involvement of some artworks' human observers in the artworks themselves). In his analysis, he suggests new ways in which art is used now to transmit ordinary lived experience. Jameson spends the first part of his book reflecting on what he calls the "problem of periodization."

The notion that there is a postmodern world which has somehow broken off from the modern world begs the questions: when did modernity begin and end, and how?

Jameson argues that it is not correct to separate the timeline of human history into discrete periods. Rather, the timeline is made up of many strands, some of which predominate over others, give rise to new strands, and fade out. Given this way of mapping out the history of ideas, Jameson believes that terms such as "postmodernity" can still be useful, since they express which strand predominates in a given moment. Jameson suggests that culture remains closely interrelated with economics and politics: an insight first shared by Marx. In other words, any given society's socioeconomic conditions are mirrored in its culture.

Next, Jameson borrows the ideas of the German-Belgian economist Ernest Mandel to explain the progression of global capitalism and its relationship to cultural production. Mandel divides capitalist history into three phases. The first, taking place in the early 1800s, was the creation of steam engines; the second, the widespread production of combustive and electrical power in the late 1800s; and the third the invention of digital and nuclear technologies in the 1940s. These technological stages correspond with three economic ones: respectively, the intra-state market economy phase; the globalizing phase; and the late capitalist phase. In turn, he states three artistic associations: the realist phase, the modernist phase, and the postmodern phase, respectively.

Jameson argues that in the postmodern era, the borders between the state, other information-manufacturing institutions, and even many individuals, have virtually dissolved. As a result, exchanges of goods and information are now much more fluid and have opened up discourses

between fields of knowledge that were once thought of as unrelated. Jameson stresses that postmodernism is not the only social arrangement of his present moment; rather, it is merely a "cultural dominant" that happens to currently exert lots of power over lived experience and intellectual life.

Indeed, many works of art and literature and socioeconomic arrangements in Jameson's time are not postmodern. However, since postmodernism is the cultural dominant, it is impossible to live totally outside the conditions it imposes on all aspects of contemporary life. Jameson concludes his book with a series of examples of recent cultural products that demonstrate postmodern thinking. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism is a rigorous criticism of a period often taken for granted as well as a treatise on the downsides of periodization.

4.3 Daniel Bell - Post Industrial Societies

The postindustrial type of society is deemed different from the industrial one in that it is based on the production of services rather than manufactured goods, the processing of information rather than material objects. **Postindustrial society**, society marked by a transition from a manufacturing - based economy to a service-based economy, a transition that is also connected with subsequent societal restructuring. Post industrialization is the next evolutionary step from an industrialized society and is most evident in countries and regions that were among the first to experience the Industrial Revolution, such as the United States, western Europe, and Japan.

American sociologist Daniel Bell first coined the term *postindustrial* in 1973. **Daniel Bell**, (born May 10, 1919, New York, New York, U.S.- died January 25, 2011, Cambridge, Massachusetts), American sociologist and

journalist who used sociological theory to reconcile what he believed were the inherent contradictions of capitalist societies.

Bell was educated at City College of New York, where he received a B.S. (1939), and was employed as a journalist for more than 20 years. As managing editor of *The New Leader* (1941–44) and labour editor for *Fortune* (1948–58), he wrote voluminously on various social subjects. After serving in Paris (1956–57) as director of the seminar program of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, he received a doctorate at Columbia University (1960), where he was appointed professor of sociology (1959–69). In 1969 Bell became a professor of sociology at Harvard University, where he remained until 1990.

Bell's extensive output has reflected his concern with political and economic institutions and the ways in which they shape the individual. Among his books are *Marxian Socialism in the United States* (1952; reprinted 1967), *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s* (1960), *The Radical Right* (1963), and *The Reforming of General Education* (1966). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973) and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976) attempt to define the relationship between science, technology, and capitalism. His views of nonconformism in contemporary society are expressed in *The Winding Passage* (1980). His work has stimulated controversy over the ideological biases among leading scholars in the discipline of sociology.

In his book *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, which describes several features of a postindustrial society. Postindustrial societies are characterized by:

1. A transition from the production of goods to the production of services, with very few firms directly manufacturing any goods.

2. The replacement of blue-collar manual labourers with technical and professional workers- such as computer engineers, doctors, and bankers- as the direct production of goods is moved elsewhere.

3. The replacement of practical knowledge with theoretical knowledge.

4. Greater attention being paid to the theoretical and ethical implications of new technologies, which helps society avoid some of the negative features of introducing new technologies, such as environmental accidents and massive widespread power outages.

5. The development of newer scientific disciplines- such as those that involve new forms of information technology, cybernetics, or artificial intelligence- to assess the theoretical and ethical implications of new technologies.

6. A stronger emphasis on the university and polytechnic institutes, which produce graduates who create and guide the new technologies crucial to a postindustrial society

In addition to the economic characteristics of a postindustrial society, changing values and norms reflect the changing influences on the society. Outsourcing of manufactured goods, for example, changes how members of a society see and treat foreigners or immigrants. Also, those individuals previously occupied in the manufacturing sector find themselves with no clearly defined social role.

There are a number of direct effects of post industrialism on the community. For the first time, the

term *community* is associated less with geographical proximity and more with scattered, but like-minded, individuals. Advances in telecommunications and the Internet mean that telecommuting becomes more common, placing people farther away from their place of work and their coworkers.

The relationship between manufacturing and services changes in a postindustrial society. Moving to a service-based economy means that manufacturing must occur elsewhere and is often outsourced (that is, sent away from a company to a contracted supplier) to industrial economies. While this gives the illusion that the postindustrial society is merely service-based, it is still highly connected with those industrial economies to which the manufacturing is outsourced.

References

1. Pierre Bourdieu - Outline of a Theory of Practice

2. Derek Layder - Understanding Social Theory

3. Giddens & Turner - Social Theory Today

4. David Owen - Sociology after Postmodernism

5. George Ritzer - Modern Sociological Theory

6. Lash Scott - Sociology of Postmodernism

7. Bryan. S. Turner - The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory

8. Steve Conner (ed) -The Cambridge Companion to Post Modernism Anthony

9. Giddens - The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.

10. Pierre Bourdieu - Social Space and Symbolic Power..

11. Michel Foucault - Discipline and Punishment. New York: Vintage Books.

12. Anthony Giddens - Consequences of Modernity..

13. Zigmunt Bauman - Intimations of Post Modernity

14. Tony Blackshaw - Zigmunt Bauman